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ABSTRACT
The rapid growth in organic products has posed a major challenge to conventional
retailer assortment planning. On the one hand, conventional retailers, driven by the
relatively high margins of organic products, have increased organic product offerings. On
the other hand, the shelf space for conventional retailers has remained the same, with
newly opened stores much smaller in sizes. Therefore, retailers need to carefully manage
their conventional product assortments to harvest the benefit of offering and increasing
organic product assortments. In order to manage the assortment efficiently, conventional
retailers need to understand how organic products would affect their existing products,
consumers, and supply chain relationships.
From the two essays that comprise this dissertation, the first essay aims to explain
how organic products would affect retailers’ conventional assortments, as well as how
supply chain power would shift the connection between organic assortments and
conventional assortment. The second essay estimates the substitution effect between
organic products and conventional products, and how consumers choose between organic
and conventional products while multiple other product attributes also present. Research
questions proposed in the essays are answered by statistical analysis of difference-indifference analysis, instrumental variable regressions, and structural estimations on
retailer scanner panel data that contains weekly product sales over a 4-year time horizon.
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Our findings suggest that a market expansion effect due to the introduction and
expansion of organic products outweighs the operational costs for increasing both organic
and conventional assortments. However, the supply chain power structure between
retailers and manufacturers as well as retailer shelf space constraints will shift the
relationship between organic and conventional assortments. We also find that consumers
are more price-sensitive in organic products, and organic condition, product style, and
seller attributes are all highly influential in shaping consumers’ purchasing decisions.
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CHAPTER 1
OVERVIEW
In the last decade or so, the U.S. organic market has more than doubled in size
(Organic Trade Association, 2018; see Figure 1.1). Driven by the relatively high margins,
conventional retailers have increased organic product offerings. As a result, instead of
being exclusively sold in local farms and national specialty stores such as Whole Foods
Market, organic products are now available in many conventional supermarkets such as
Publix, Kroger, and Target, and also in drug stores and convenience stores such as CVS
Pharmacy and 7-Eleven. Despite the fast-growing trend for organic products, sales of
organic food accounted for a mere 5.3% of total food sales in 2016 (Organic Trade
Association, 2016), implying that 94.7% of total food sales is still attributable to
conventional products. The rapid growth of organic products creates both opportunities
and challenges for retailers and manufacturers. Moreover, this rapid growth also has
complex effects on product assortment and supply chain operations decisions.
One of the major challenges for retailers comes from balancing the assortment
between conventional and organic products given limited shelf space (Hooker &
Shanahan, 2012). That is, although organic product variety has increased substantially
during the past decade, retailer shelf space did not grow concomitantly. Moreover, newly
opened stores are about 25 percent smaller than existing stores (McKinsey & Company,
2013). Therefore, growth in total product variety spikes operating costs and increases the
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possibility of stock-outs, which ultimately hurts retailers’ profits (Alfaro & Corbett,
2003; Fisher & Ittner, 1999; Shockley et al., 2015; Ton & Raman, 2010). As a result,
introducing or increasing organic product variety requires retailers to restructure
conventional product assortments to maintain the total variety at a manageable level. This
is of particular concern for stores that have tighter space constraints, such as stores
located in urban areas and for convenience stores. Therefore, growth in organic product
variety could possibly cannibalize conventional product variety, which ultimately hurts
retailer’s revenue from the conventional product segment.
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Figure 1.1: Organic Sales and Growth
Another challenge for retailers is to understand consumer substitution between
organic and conventional products. Recent studies suggest that although the “hardcore”
organic consumers may be less price-sensitive, the majority of organic consumers do care
about organic pricing. A 2009 study by the Hartman Group found that there are three key
consumer demographics: While 21% of the total consumers buy organic products
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exclusively, 65% of the total consumers buy both organic products and conventional
products. The “occasional” organic consumers bring both opportunities and challenges to
conventional supermarkets. On the one hand, carrying conventional products may reduce
the loss of sales when a specific organic product is not available. On the other hand,
retailers should also beware of low-margin conventional products cannibalize the sales of
high-margin organic products. Therefore, it is important to understand how consumers
choose between organic and conventional products and how much does conventional
products cannibalize the sales of organic products. Especially for those retailers who
carry both types of products.
In this dissertation, we investigate the impact of organic products on conventional
products and on retailer assortment planning. In Chapter 2, we focus on how retailers
would change their conventional product assortment when they first introducing organic
products, as well as when they increase their organic product varieties. We use four years
(2008-2011) of weekly scanner data obtained from Information Resources Inc. (IRi) and
employ econometric methods to study the relationship between organic and conventional
product offerings at the retail store level for the yogurt category. We find that, when
stores first introduce organic products to one of their product categories, or when stores
increase organic products to one of their product categories, conventional product variety
in that product category also increases, ceteris paribus. This finding suggests that there is
a market expansion effect from variety-seeking organic product customers who are drawn
to stores because of the increase in organic product variety. Since the new variety-seeking
consumers also tend to purchase conventional products, retail stores are encouraged to
increase the variety of conventional products as well. However, we also find that this
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market expansion effect is constrained by store size: while larger stores can increase
more conventional product variety, smaller stores can experience an overall decrease in
conventional product variety. This finding confirms the presence of cannibalizing effects
between organic and conventional products when capacity constraints are significant. In
addition, by focusing on product assortment decision-making across the supply chain, we
find that for retailers facing highly concentrated manufacturers, the positive relationship
between the introduction of organic products and conventional product variety tends to be
weakened. That is, the higher costs and capacity constraints associated with product
variety, tends to discourage manufacturers from increasing overall product variety. We
also find that, for retailers with strong private-label presence, the relationship between
organic products and conventional products is reversed. That is, retailers with strong
private-label presence increase private-label conventional products at the expense of
national brand conventional products when they expand their organic product offerings.
In Chapter 3 of this dissertation, we focus on the relative effect of product attributes
(price, brand, nutrition information, style, etc.) and seller-related attributes (store type,
store size, promotion, advertising, etc.) on consumers’ choices for organic products. We
use four years (2008-2011) of weekly scanner data obtained from Information Resources
Inc. (IRi) and employ structural estimation techniques developed in the empirical
industrial organization literature to conduct our analysis (Berry 1994). Our main findings
suggest that organic condition, product style, and seller attributes are all highly influential
in shaping consumers’ purchasing decisions. Further, the relationship between organic
and conventional products is much more nuanced and context-specific than previously
shown. We find organic products always have a higher own-price elasticity than
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conventional products, suggesting that even organic consumers are willing to pay a
higher price, they are also sensitive to organic prices. We also find that the cross-price
elasticities between organic products and conventional products are asymmetry. This
asymmetry cross-price elasticity suggests that price change in conventional products has
less effect on organic products than vice-versa, consistent with the asymmetric price
competition literature (Sethuraman & Srinivasan, 2002). However, this effect is also
content-specific. While in some product categories such as All-Natural yogurt and
Creamy yogurt, price change in conventional products has a greater effect on organic
products. This finding suggests that consumers have different preferences for different
product specifications.
In Chapter 4, we conclude with a summary of findings, limitations, and future
research directions.
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CHAPTER 2
ORGANIC PRODUCT AND CONVENTIONAL PRODUCT
ASSORTMENT: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY
ABSTRACT
The rapid growth in demand for organic products has posed a major challenge for
conventional product assortment decisions in grocery stores. In this research, we address
the research issue of how inducing organic product variety influences conventional
product variety. Using theoretical arguments, we propose that supply chain effects,
specifically, private-label presence and supplier concentration, influence this relationship.
We also propose that store size can influence this key relationship. Conventional product
sales account for more than 90% of total sales for grocery stores. While introducing
organic products attracts new customers and increases demand, it may also cannibalize
conventional product variety. Such effects have important implications to product
assortment decisions in supply chains, and yet, this dilemma has received very little
attention in the operations management literature. Using scanner data from retailers for
yogurt purchases from 2008 to 2011, we construct panel-based econometric models to
examine the relationship between organic product variety and conventional product
variety. We show that when retail stores who have never sold organic yogurt in the past,
first introduce organic yogurt to the store, conventional yogurt variety also increases. We
also find that for retailers who expand their organic yogurt variety offerings, conventional
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yogurt variety offerings also increases. Taken together, these results suggest a market
expansion effect due to the introduction and expansion of organic products. However, in
the presence of private-label products or with retailers facing more concentrated
manufacturers, this correlation may be reversed; that is, the growth of private-label
products mitigates the growth of conventional products. Also, when faced with more
concentrated manufacturers, the growth of organic products lowers the growth of
conventional products. Our findings suggest that when shelf space is abundant, retailers
tend to increase conventional product variety along with organic product variety.
However, if shelf space is limited, retailers are better off substituting conventional
products with organic products.
Keywords: Organic Products, Conventional Products, Variety, Assortment Management,
Supply Chains

2.1. INTRODUCTION
In the last decade or so, the U.S. organic market has more than doubled in size
(Organic Trade Association, 2018; see Figure 1.1). Driven by the relatively high margins,
conventional retailers have increased organic product offerings. As a result, instead of
being exclusively sold in local farms and national specialty stores such as Whole Foods
Market, organic products are now available in many conventional supermarkets such as
Publix, Kroger, and Target, and also in drug stores and convenience stores such as CVS
Pharmacy and 7-Eleven. Despite the fast-growing trend for organic products, sales of
organic food accounted for a mere 5.3% of total food sales in 2016 (Organic Trade
Association, 2016), implying that 94.7% of total food sales is still attributable to
conventional products. The rapid growth of organic products creates both opportunities
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and challenges for retailers and manufacturers. Moreover, this rapid growth also has
complex effects on product assortment and supply chain operations decisions.
The major challenges for retailers come from balancing the assortment between
conventional and organic products given limited shelf space (Hooker & Shanahan, 2012).
That is, although organic product variety has increased substantially during the past
decade, retailer shelf space did not grow concomitantly. Moreover, newly opened stores
are about 25 percent smaller than existing stores (McKinsey & Company, 2013).
Therefore, growth in total product variety spikes operating costs and increases the
possibility of stock-outs, which ultimately hurts retailers’ profits (Alfaro & Corbett,
2003; Fisher & Ittner, 1999; Shockley et al., 2015; Ton & Raman, 2010). As a result,
introducing or increasing organic product variety requires retailers to restructure
conventional product assortments to maintain the total variety at a manageable level. This
is of particular concern for stores that have tighter space constraints, such as stores
located in urban areas and for convenience stores. Therefore, growth in organic product
variety could possibly cannibalize conventional product variety, which ultimately hurts
retailer’s revenue from the conventional product segment.
The rapidly expanding demand for organic products can be attributed to the
increasing number of organic product consumers. Organic product consumers tend to be
health-conscious, highly educated, have higher disposable incomes and lower price
sensitivities (Krystallis et al., 2006). Moreover, 75% of organic product consumers also
purchase conventional products when they find conventional products to be attractive .
Their variety seeking behavior could also potentially “spill-over” to purchasing other
products, and the resulting market expansion effect would benefit retailers who offer both
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organic products and conventional products. This is especially appealing to new organic
product consumers. A 2009 study by the Hartman Group reports that 21% of all
consumers buy organic products exclusively, while 65% of all consumers buy both
conventional and organic products (Chait, 2017), suggesting that this market expansion
effect could be substantial. If this is the case, then the growth of organic products
presents an opportunity for retailers to leverage growing demand from organic product
customers by increasing both the variety of organic products and the variety of highquality conventional products. Therefore, the overarching question of this paper is: Given
the market expansion opportunity and assortment challenges brought about by the
introduction of organic products, how do retailers manage conventional product variety
while introducing or increasing organic product variety?
From a supply chain perspective, the effect of growing product variety presents
different challenges for retailers and manufacturers. Increasing product variety not only
increases indirect costs for both manufacturers and retailers, such as inventory carrying
costs and stock-out risks, (Alfaro & Corbett, 2003; Fisher & Ittner, 1999; Ton & Raman,
2010) but also direct costs, such as increased setup times (Martin & Ishii, 1996) and
change-overs (Van Ryzin & Mahajan, 1999), for manufacturers. These costs may be
especially high for manufacturers who produce both organic and conventional products.
Because of the strict and specialized production requirements for organic products ,
manufacturers could lose throughput volume and concomitant economies of scale if they
introduce organic products and/or increase product variety for both organic and
conventional products. Unlike retailers who could possibly benefit from increasing
conventional product variety, manufacturers who try to increase both conventional and
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organic product offerings would most likely face higher costs and resource
cannibalization issues (Roberts & McEvily, 2005). This potential misalignment between
interests of retailers and manufacturers leads to our second research question: How does
supply chain power, as reflected via product assortment decisions, influence the
relationship between the introduction of organic products (or increasing the variety of
organic products) and the variety of conventional products?
A retailer or a manufacturer could influence product assortment decisions by
exerting its power in the supply chain. For retailers, sourcing from a single manufacturer
weakens the retailer’s control over assortment decisions and creates a source of
bargaining power for the manufacturer (Newman, 1989; Porter, 2008). This is a common
concern in category management, wherein retailers defer product assortment decisions
within categories to a leading manufacturer (Kurtuluş & Toktay, 2004). Conversely,
supplier’s (manufacturer’s) power over the buyer (retailer) is weakened when the retailer
splits its total requirements among multiple suppliers (Burke et. al., 2007). Therefore,
sourcing from a larger number of manufacturers allows retailers better control over
product assortment decisions, which could then lead to a higher variety of both organic
products and conventional products, thereby yielding higher total revenue.
Another common retailer practice with implications for product assortment
decisions is the introduction of private-label products (Ailawadi & Keller, 2004). Privatelabel products are defined as store brands that are managed by retailers and are often
more profitable than products of national brands (Heller, 2011; Quelch & Harding, 1996).
The presence of strong private-label products could lead to higher retailer power and
lower power of national brand manufacturers (Chintagunta et al., 2002; Morton &
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Zettelmeyer, 2004). Therefore, retailer with strong private-label product presence could
utilize its supply chain power, which then leads to a higher variety of both organic
products and conventional products.
Despite the importance of product assortment decisions in supply chains, the
relationship between organic product growth and conventional product assortment has
not been adequately studied in the operations management literature. As the first of such
efforts, this study addresses the following two important research questions: (1) Does
conventional product variety increase or decrease when organic product is introduced
(or its variety increases) at the store level? (2) Does the control of assortment decisions
in the supply chain affect assortments between organic and conventional products?
Specifically, in the main analysis, we first examine how conventional product variety
could change when retailers first introduced organic products to the store. Second, we
examine how a retailer faced with more concentrated—and therefore more powerful—
manufacturers would make assortment decisions involving both organic and conventional
product variety. Third, we examine how a retailer with the option of introducing privatelabel products would make product assortment decisions involving organic and
conventional product variety. As an extension, we further broaden our research question
to examine how conventional product variety would change when organic product variety
increases in stores who have already sold organic products.
We use four years (2008-2011) of weekly scanner data obtained from Information
Resources Inc. (IRi) and employ econometric methods to study the relationship between
organic and conventional product offerings at the retail store level for the yogurt
category. The major findings from this research are summarized as follows. First, we
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constructed a difference in differences study, using stores that started to sell organic
product during our time of study and stores that has never sold organic products, to
examine how conventional product variety changes when a retailer introduces organic
products. We find that, when stores first introduce organic products to one of their
product categories, conventional product variety in that product category also increases,
ceteris paribus. This finding suggests that there is a market expansion effect from varietyseeking organic product customers who are drawn to stores because of the introduction of
organic products. Since the new variety-seeking consumers also tend to purchase
conventional products, retail stores are encouraged to increase the variety of conventional
products as well. However, we also find that this market expansion effect is constrained
by store size: while larger stores can increase more conventional product variety, smaller
stores can experience an overall decrease in conventional product variety. This finding
confirms the presence of cannibalizing effects between organic and conventional
products when capacity constraints are significant. Second, by focusing on product
assortment decision-making across the supply chain, we find that for retailers facing
highly concentrated manufacturers, the positive relationship between the introduction of
organic product and conventional product variety tends to be weakened. This is because
such retailers have less control over the assortment decisions in the supply chain. This
weakening effect, which results from the higher costs and capacity constraints associated
with product variety, tends to discourage manufacturers from increasing overall product
variety. Greater manufacturer control over product assortment decisions, as indicated by
a more concentrated manufacturer base, allows manufacturers to counter pressures of
increasing product variety away from the interests of retailers. We also find that, for
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retailers with strong private-label presence, the relationship between organic products and
conventional products is reversed. That is, although retailers who have a strong presence
of private-labels also have higher power over assortment decisions, conventional product
variety in these retailers would decrease when organic product is introduced. In the
extension, we further broaden our study to stores who have already been selling organic
products, and examine what happens to conventional product variety when these stores
increase their organic product variety. Therefore, we use all stores in our data and use
instrumental variables approach to study the relationship between organic product variety
and conventional product variety. In addition, we also examine how supplier
concentration, private-label presence, and store size affects the relationship between
organic product and conventional product variety. We find that conventional product
variety is still positively correlated with organic product variety, and the same consistent
results holds true in the presence of higher supplier concentration and private-label
presence. This finding suggests that the market expansion effect is not limited to stores
that first introduced organic products, but also holds for stores that have already offered
organic products. We further find that retailers with strong private-label presence increase
private-label conventional products at the expense of national brand conventional
products when they expand their organic product offerings. In addition, after controlling
for market demand and population density, we find larger stores tends to increase more
conventional product variety.
Our research contributes to the operations management literature as follows. First,
we distinguish how increasing organic product variety is different from a price
discrimination strategy which is based on consumers' willingness to pay for quality
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(Mussa & Rosen, 1978; Moorthy, 1984; Horsky & Nelson, 1992). However, while price
discrimination strategy may not increase total demand (Quelch & Kenny, 1994),
increasing organic product offerings increases total demand by attracting new, variety
seeking organic consumers. Similarly, while price discrimination strategy is prone to the
cannibalization problems (Randall et al., 1998), retailers actually benefit from the fact
that organic consumers would also purchase conventional products. Therefore, we
contribute to the literature by empirically investigating the impact of organic product
variety on conventional products as an assortment outcome. Second, we contribute to the
literature by establishing the role of supply chains in assortment decisions involving
organic products. Managing organic products in supply chains poses a significant
challenge to making product assortment decisions because the benefits and costs
associated with organic product offerings are not congruent among supply chain
members. We show that assortment decisions are associated with supply chain
governance and control and that retailers benefit from market expansion and, therefore,
play a leading role in the movement towards organic product introduction. We
demonstrate that retailers with a larger percentage of private-label products, or those
sourcing from a larger group of manufacturers, tend to have more control over the
assortment decisions and tend to take advantage of greater organic product variety. Taken
together, these findings suggest that the growth of organic products is demand-driven and
that there is a variety-seeking organic customer base that spills over to the demand for
conventional products, thereby expanding the conventional product market. However,
this effect may be mitigated by small store size, which is indicative of capacity
constraints. Our findings also highlight the fact that power distribution in the

14

manufacturer-supplier supply chain could affect the growth in conventional product
variety.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides a review of
the organic product and product assortment literature. Data, including dependent variable,
independent variables, and control variables, are described in Section 2.3, and the
difference-in-differences model is described in Section 2.4. The results are presented in
Section 2.5. We present model extensions and discuss results and alternative explanations
in Section 2.6. Finally, we provide the theoretical and managerial implications of this
research and conclude in Section 2.7.

2.2. LITERATURE REVIEW
In this section, we review the literature from three related streams of research:
organic products, product assortments, and supply chain governance. Our review is
grouped according to demand-side issues and supply-side issues as it pertains to our
research questions. We first discuss the impact of organic products on the food supply
chain. We then turn to product assortment decisions that have implications for retailers,
manufacturers, and customers. Finally, we review the role of supply chain governance
issues, such as power, in product assortment decisions.
2.2.1 IMPACT OF ORGANIC PRODUCTS ON FOOD SUPPLY CHAINS
On the demand side, consumer demand for organic products has grown by doubledigits almost every year since the 1990s. Organic product sales have increased from $3.6
billion in 1997 to $47 billion in 2016 (Organic Trade Association, 2016). Consumers
value organic food because it is seen as being healthier, more nutritious, better tasting,
and safer because no chemicals are used in its production (Bauer et al., 2013). They buy
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organic produce according to the “dirty dozen and clean fifteen” standards, which
identify groceries with the most pesticide residue and those with the least contamination
(Pou, 2010). Organic farming is also perceived to be “gentler” on the environment and is
therefore seen as being more socially responsible (Fotopoulos & Krystallis, 2002; Larue
et al., 2004; Wier & Calverly, 2002). Consumers of organic products tend to have higher
education, namely a graduate degree (Govindasamy et al., 2017; Grossman, 1972;
Lockie, 2002; Schifferstein & Ophuist, 1998) and income levels above $75,000 (Kriwy &
Mecking, 2012; Zhang et al., 2008). Importantly, this growing segment of consumers
does not exclusively buy organic products. A 2009 study by the Hartman Group found
that, while 21% of consumers buy organic only, 65% of consumers buy both
conventional and organic products (Chait, 2017). Evidence shows that organic customers
also purchase conventional products if they find them attractive, particularly when the
prices of organic products are too high or when the supply of organic products is limited
(Hudson, 2012).
On the supply side, organic products are expensive to grow and produce throughout
the supply chain partly due to stringent standards (Dumas, 2015). The United States
Department of Agriculture (USDA) imposes specific requirements that must be verified
by an accredited third-party certifying agent before products can be labeled as “organic.”
For instance, the use of synthetic fertilizers, pesticides, herbicides, irradiation, sewage
sludge, hormones, antibiotics, and genetic engineering is strictly prohibited (USDA,
2019). Other reasons for the higher cost of organic food include farming practices that
usually require high labor content and the segregation of organic ingredients from
conventional ones. All of these factors contribute to higher prices for organic products
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compared to their conventional product counterparts (see Figure 2.1). At the same time,
organic products enjoy higher gross margins, ranging from 30% to 50%, compared to
margins of conventional products, which range from 20% to 25% (Bezawada & Pauwels,
2013; Oberholtzer et al., 2006; Roheim & D’Silva, 2009). In sum, the growing organic
product offerings provide opportunities for market expansion but pose serious challenges
in product assortment decisions and cost efficiencies in the supply chain. To the best of
our knowledge, no prior research in the literature of operations management has
addressed these opportunities and challenges.

Figure 2.1: Organic Food Price Versus Conventional Food Price
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service estimates from Nielsen Homescan data
(2010)
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2.2.2. PRICE DISCRIMINATION STRATEGY AND ASSORTMENT
Introducing or increasing product variety for organic products is similar to price
discrimination strategy, where organic products are introduced in the same product
category but with a different price and quality balance (Pitta & Prevel Katsanis, 1995).
However, the growth of organic product variety affects assortment decisions in a way that
is quite different from traditional price discrimination strategy. In this section, we will
first focus on assortment studies from the retailers’ and manufacturers’ perspectives, and
discuss why it is different from price discrimination strategy.
From a retailer’s perspective, price discrimination strategy generally refers to
increasing product variety, which stimulates sales by segmenting customers and
attracting variety-seeking shoppers (Bayus & Putsis, 1999; Ton & Raman, 2010; Xia &
Rajagopalan, 2009). Similarly, there are also challenges to carrying a higher variety of
products. High variety drives lower inventory levels of individual items, which reduces
the items’ visibility on shelves, increases the risk of stock-outs, and imposes high
restocking costs due to the need for frequent replenishment (see Mantrala et al., 2009 for
an extensive review). High variety also drives up operations complexity, which also leads
to higher costs (Shockley et al., 2015). In addition, high variety is also constrained by the
ultimate retailer resources----the shelf space available in stores (Corstjens & Doyle,
1981). Last but not the least, high variety would lead to cannibalization; lower end
products would cannibalize the sales of higher end products, leading to profit loss
(Parlaktürk, 2012).
Given the tradeoff between profit generation and cost efficiency, prior research
reports mixed findings of both a positive relationship between assortment depth and
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category sales in some cases (Borle et al., 2005; Van Ryzin & Mahajan, 1999) as well as
a negative relationship in other cases (Boatwright & Nunes, 2001; Broniarczyk et al.,
1998; Dreze et al., 1994). However, there are several aspects that sets organic products
apart from traditional price discrimination strategy. Firstly, organic products attract new
organic consumers to retail stores that previously did not carry organic products; this new
customer base increases demand. We refer to such effect as “market expansion.”
Therefore, price discrimination strategy is favorable to retailers because offering new
organic products (or increasing variety of organic products) would actually increase the
total category demand. Second, among these new organic consumers, the majority are
also willing to buy conventional products. Imagine a scenario where a retail store only
carries conventional yogurt products such as Yoplait and Dannon Original. When the
store starts to carry Stonyfield Organic yogurt, it attracts new organic consumers, who
had never shopped at the store. In addition, the majority of these organic consumers
would also purchase high-end conventional yogurts such as Chobani Greek yogurt, which
the store had never carried before. It would be more beneficial for this retailer to
simultaneously introduce both the Stonyfield Organic yogurt and the Chobani Greek
yogurt to better serve the new organic consumers. Therefore, due to the fact that the
majority of organic consumers also purchases high-end conventional products, the
cannibalization effect from the lower-end products (Yoplait and Dannon Original) to
higher-end products (Stonyfield and Chobani) are less of a concern. Rather, retailers
could introduce more high-quality conventional products to attract organic consumers
when organic products are out of stock. Taken together, without the concern of steady
category demand or cannibalization issues, we believe that the “market expansion” effect

19

of organic products would be more pronounced than the cost associated with increasing
overall product variety. Therefore, increasing conventional product variety along with
offering organic products will be more beneficial for most retailers.
From a manufacturer’s perspective, the introduction of line extensions by
manufacturing firms is motivated by a number of factors including, targeting different
customer segments and/or satisfying the customers’ desire for ‘something different’,
matching a competitor’s successful line extension, increasing the firm’s share of retail
shelf space allocated to the category, and utilizing excess manufacturing capacity (Quelch
& Kenny, 1994). However, the pitfalls of product line extension are also significant.
Over-segmentation would cannibalize company resource and confuse consumers;
increasing number of suppliers would diminish manufacturing control and power; and
ultimately, product lines would cannibalize each other (Quelch & Kenny, 1994; Roberts
& McEvily, 2005).
More specifically, increase in product variety could lead to higher cost in the supply
chain. This is because increasing total variety is not only associated with indirect costs,
such as inventory stock-out costs (Alfaro & Corbett, 2003; Fisher & Ittner, 1999; Ton &
Raman, 2010), but also with direct costs, such as increased setup times (Martin & Ishii,
1996) and change-over costs (Van Ryzin & Mahajan, 1999). Therefore, simply increasing
variety does not guarantee an increase in long-term profits and can, in fact, reduce cost
competitiveness (Ramdas & Sawhney, 2001). Using a rational approach, firms should
strive to balance the revenue and cost impact of variety decisions (Lancaster, 1990) to
maximize long-term profits. MacDuffie, Sethuraman, and Fisher (1996) identify three
types of variety—model-mix variety, options variety, and parts variety—and they find
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that increasing parts variety significantly reduces productivity. For consumer product
manufacturers, increasing organic product variety significantly increases parts variety
because the raw materials of organic products must also be organic (e.g., organic milk,
fruits, and vegetables), and therefore, they are different from materials used for
conventional products (e.g., conventional milk, fruits, and vegetables). These raw
material differences further complicate operations and increase costs by undermining the
delayed variation strategy, wherein manufacturers benefit from the reduction in buffer
inventories via risk pooling and increased flexibility (Lee & Tang, 1997). In addition to
the costs of strategic changes, manufacturers also face higher costs as organic product
variety increases because of the limited supply of organic materials and stricter
regulations for production and sourcing processes of organic products (Klonsky, 2012).
Taken together, increasing organic variety has much more significant cost implications to
manufacturers than to retailers. The misalignment of interest between retailers and
manufacturers is significant, and therefore, in the next section, we review supply chain
governance literature and investigate how supply chain power influences the assortment
outcomes on the retailer’s side.
2.2.3. ASSORTMENT DECISIONS IN SUPPLY CHAINS
As we can see from the previous subsection, the effects of organic product
assortment on retailers and manufacturers are different, with retailers largely benefiting
from market expansion, and manufacturers incurring much of the costs. This divergence
of interests and incentives across the supply chain highlights the need for considering the
role of supply chain power structure on product assortment decision making. More
specifically, product assortment decisions in supply chains are often controlled by parties
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with power, which can be manifested by a higher concentration of retailers or of
manufacturers. For instance, we expect retailers

facing

highly concentrated

manufacturers to carry a different product assortment (which benefits manufacturers)
than that from retailers facing less concentrated manufacturers.
Much of the long-established debate concerning retailer-manufacturer relationships
has focused on the issue of power and the balance of power within these relationships
(El-Ansary & Stern, 1972; French et al., 1959; Gaski, 1984; Hunt & Nevin, 1974; Lusch
& Brown, 1982). Central to this debate is the issue of dependency, whether real or
perceived. Steiner (1984) argues that the relative power of manufacturers and their
retailers is governed by whether shoppers are inclined towards switching stores within
brands or brands within stores. In the case of the former, manufacturers will dominate the
channel, while in the case of the latter, retailers will hold sway. Next, we elaborate on the
two key factors that contribute to the power relationships between the retailer and
manufacturer.
First, a concentrated manufacturer base means that retailers will find it difficult to
find alternative suppliers for products demanded by their end customers, which gives
these manufacturers more power in the relationship. For example, because the soft drink
industry is highly concentrated (dominated by Coca-Cola, PepsiCo, and Dr. Pepper), no
major retailer can delist Coco-Cola and its high-performing brands. If a retailer were to
do so, it might lose a big portion of its customer base. A concentrated group of
manufacturers may create a consolidated force that influences product assortment
decisions, which are, in turn, based on profit margins and product availability (Steiner,
1993). For instance, powerful manufacturers may strategically choose to produce less
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differentiated products, which reduces product variety and their own costs (Inderst &
Shaffer, 2007). Therefore, when manufacturers are more concentrated, they have more
power and control over product assortment decisions. Thus, in this case, lower
conventional product variety is expected such that the combined product variety (organic
and conventional) does not increase excessive direct costs. On the contrary, when
manufacturers are more diffused, retailers have more power and control over product
assortment decisions, and we would expect higher conventional product variety in stores
so that retailers are able to benefit from the market expansion effect.
Second, power in the supply chain has largely shifted toward retailers over the years,
aided by the proliferation of private-label products . Private-label products are store
brands owned by retailers. This ownership often results in higher margins that provide
incentives for retailers to grow their market share of private-label products via low
wholesale and retail prices (Bontems et al., 1999; Meza & Sudhir, 2010). In addition,
private-label products enhance store brands with better product and service quality,
customer loyalty, store differentiation, and store profitability (Ailawadi et al., 2008;
Corstjens & Lal, 2000; Martos-Partal & González-Benito, 2011). In sum, extensive
private-label coverage yields retailers more power and control over product assortment
decisions (Dunne & Narasimhan, 1999; Quelch & Harding, 1996). Narasimhan and
Wilcox (1998) argue that retailers introduce private-labels in a category not only to gain
profits directly from the private-label but also to use private-labels as a strategic weapon
to elicit concessions from national brand manufacturers. More importantly, Meza and
Sudhir (2010) found that retailers not only gain power from private-labels, but also
strategically help private-labels gain market share by setting the corresponding national
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brand product price higher than its optimal price. Similarly, research has also found that
retailers would protect their private-label products by reducing the presence of the
competing manufacturers’ products in their assortment (Alan et al., 2017). Moreover,
lower quality national brand products are less profitable when competing with privatelabel products (Alan et al., 2019). This raises a contradictory effect in our research
context wherein retailers have greater power and control on product assortment decisions,
and yet conventional product variety also decreases. Retailers with strong private-label
product lines would utilize their private-label products to further increase their supply
chain power. Therefore, such retailers could increase private-label product variety
(organic and conventional) to attract organic product consumers, but at the same time
decrease branded conventional product variety to maintain both operational efficiencies
and enhanced supply chain power. Therefore, the overall effect of introducing organic
products (or increasing organic product variety) on conventional product variety at the
store level may be negative.
In summary, the rapid growth of organic products has challenged product assortment
decision making in supply chains. This is particularly true for conventional products that
remain the dominant source of revenue for most retailers. Because prior research that
links assortment of organic products and conventional products is limited, we empirically
examine the relationship between organic products and conventional product variety and
test how this relationship is affected by supply chain power and the ensuing product
assortment decisions. More specifically, we examine how manufacturer concentration
and the presence of private-label products affect the relationship between organic product
variety and conventional product variety.
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2.3. DATA AND MEASURES
We first describe our data source and sample size in Section 2.3.1. Since we
measure both the introduction of organic products (main analysis) and the increase of
organic products (extension), we describe our full data sample in section 2.3.1.1, and the
data sample used for difference-in-differences analysis in section 2.3.1.2. We then
describe the dependent, independent, and control variables used in our analyses in
Section 2.3.2.
2.3.1.1 FULL SAMPLE DATA
We use four years of proprietary scanner data (2008-2011) from IRi, which reports
data for grocery chains and drug stores in 50 markets in the U.S. (except Alaska and
Hawaii). The raw data contains three files that separately report: 1) weekly Stock
Keeping Unit (SKU) sales and unit price, 2) SKU attributes (e.g., product type, organic
status, and product size), and 3) store information (location, chain affiliates, market, and
store’s annual sales). An SKU is defined as a unique combination of brand, flavor,
weight, container material, container size, and pack size. We first use the Universal
Product Code (UPC) number to identify each SKU and then combine the SKU sales data
with the SKU attributes data. We then use the store ID from both the SKU sales data and
store information data to arrive at our final sample. We use data pertaining to the yogurt
category for two main reasons. First, we observe weekly sales data only and not the
actual shelf display data. Fast-moving items such as yogurts have a comparably shorter
shelf life. Therefore, for such items, the number of SKUs sold in each week is a good
approximation of the number of SKUs on the shelf. Second, the assortment of yogurts has
changed dramatically over the years. For example, the total number of varieties of yogurt
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in the US market soared 32% from 4,581 in 2008 to 6,053 in 2011. In comparison, the
organic SKU category increased 30%, from 256 SKUs (in 2008) to 331 SKUs (in 2011).
The yogurt category in the raw data has 7,112 SKUs in total, including discontinued
SKUs and yogurt by-products, such as almond yogurt, buffalo milk yogurt, yogurt
smoothies, and kefir. We dropped all yogurt by-products in our study to focus on the
main yogurt category products. Figure 2.2 shows the time-series data of the ratio of total
organic yogurt sales revenue to conventional yogurt sales revenue. As can be gleaned
from this figure, the ratio of total organic yogurt sales revenue to conventional yogurt
sales revenue in year 2008 was 7.73% (32 million dollars compared to 414 million
dollars, respectively). In 2009, the ratio increased slightly to 7.77% (34.1 million dollars
compared to 439 million dollars, respectively). However, since 2009 this ratio shows a
decreasing trend. In particular, in 2010, the ratio decreased to 7.68% (33.7 million dollars
in organic sales compared to 439 million dollars in conventional sales), and in 2011, this
ratio decreased to 6.61% (28.9 million dollars in organic sales compared to 437 million
dollars in conventional sales). The decline in market share of organic yogurt after 2010
may reflect growing nonorganic sales of Greek-style yogurt and yogurt drinks, products
that were not readily available in organic forms (USDA, 2017). Our final sample is an
unbalanced panel dataset that contains 208 weeks of data for 1,896 stores in 50 markets.
Two kinds of stores are included in our dataset: grocery stores and drug/convenience
stores. There are 1,561 grocery stores and 335 drug/convenience stores in our final
sample. Our dataset does not contain wholesale clubs such as Costco and Sam’s Club.
Across all the stores, there are 6,053 yogurt SKUs, including 242 brands produced by 88
manufacturers (including private-labels).
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Figure 2.2: Data Description: Organic versus Conventional Yogurt Sales
2.3.1.2 DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES DATA
We further identify stores that has never sold organic products during the 4-year
time span and stores that started to sell organic products during the 4-year time span.
Among the 1,896 stores in the full sample, 113 stores began selling organic yogurt at
some point during the study period (treatment), and 431 stores have never sold any
organic product during the 3-year time span (control). By observing the store annual
revenue, we find that the treatment stores are heavily skewed towards the “large store”
side, therefore, for the quality of the propensity score matching, we further trimmed down
our sample by dropping the treatment stores that fall in the top 10% annual revenue, and
the bottom 10% annual revenue. Our final sample arrives at 81 treatment stores and 431
control stores. In addition, out of the 81 stores that introduced organic products during
our observed time span, 12 stores introduced organic products from a new supplier that
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was previously not in the stores’ supplier list whereas the remaining 69 stores introduced
organic product from an existing supplier.
2.3.2.1. DEPENDENT VARIABLES
ConVarit represents the number of conventional SKUs in store i at week t. The
number of SKUs is a well-accepted measure of product variety in the extant literature
(Alfaro & Corbett, 2003; Borle et al., 2005; Fisher & Ittner, 1999; Wan et al., 2012).
SKU is a unique identifier of a product; any changes in a product (i.e., manufacturer,
brand, flavor, size, or packaging) would result in a new SKU. We specifically grouped
and calculated our product variety variables based on the requirements of each of our
research questions. For example, in order to test the effects on conventional product
variety, we calculated the number of SKUs of conventional yogurt sold in store i at week
t. As explained above, the number of SKUs sold is a good proxy for the number of SKUs
carried in the store because yogurts are fast-moving items that have a relatively shorter
shelf life.
2.3.2.2. MAIN INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Treati represents the indicator for stores that began to sell organic yogurts during our
time span. It is coded as 1 for all stores that launched organic yogurt products within our
observed time frame and 0 for all stores that never sold organic yogurt products within
our observed time frame.
Afterit is 1 for all weeks after organic yogurt is introduced for both the treatment
group and its constructed control group, and 0 for all weeks before organic yogurt is
introduced for both the treatment group and its constructed control group. Our focal
independent variable therefore is the interaction between the Treati and Afterit. Using

28

difference-in-differences analysis, we compare the change in average conventional
product variety in stores that do not introduce organic products and stores that introduce
organic products.
PriLabelit represents the ratio of private-label SKUs to the total number of SKUs in
store i at week t. To test the effect of private-label presence for a store, we measured the
proportion of shelf space occupied by private-label yogurts in a store. Prior studies have
considered private-label revenue share as a proxy for the proportion of shelf space
occupied by private-label products in a store (Ailawadi et al., 2008; Corstjens & Lal,
2000). However, this may not be an appropriate measure in our context because large
revenue could be generated by a few product assortments. In order to account for the
shelf space taken up by private-label products, we created the private-label product
variety ratio, calculated as the ratio of the number of private-label SKUs to the total
variety. We used private-label variety ratio instead of the number of SKUs of privatelabel products because this ratio better represents the significance of private-label
products at the store level. This measure is similar to the one used by Gómez Suárez
(2005), who defined the percentage of space occupied by private-label as follows:
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑡 =

𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑆𝐾𝑈𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑖 𝑎𝑡 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘 𝑡
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝐾𝑈𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑖 𝑎𝑡 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘 𝑡

HHIit represents the manufacturer concentration in store i in week t of year T. To test
the effect of manufacturer concentration, we calculated the store level HerfindahlHirschman index (HHI) for the store’s suppliers. The HHI is the most frequently used
measure of market concentration to study market structure and firm performance
(Cotterill, 1986). In our case, a higher HHI implies a more concentrated base of
manufacturers for the store. In particular, we first calculated the ratio of annual revenue
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generated by each yogurt manufacturer for each retail chain and then calculated the sum
of the squared term of each manufacturer’s revenue ratio to the chain to compute the
HHI. We use retail chains instead of single stores because product assortment decisions
are mostly chain-level decisions, and store branches do not have the power to negotiate
with yogurt manufacturers in terms of their product assortment offerings. We used annual
revenue ratio instead of weekly ratio because revenue ratio may change dramatically on a
weekly basis depending on store promotions, advertisements, and new product launches.
In addition, grocery chains do not tend to negotiate with the manufacturers and change
their product assortments on a weekly basis. We believe that using annual revenue ratio
best represents the market concentration of manufacturers in a retail chain.
𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑟 𝑗 𝑖𝑛 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑇 2
𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑡 = ∑(
)
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑇
𝑗

2.3.2.3. CONTROL VARIABLES
We control for other time-varying product and store characteristics that could
correlate with our dependent variable.
MeanPackageit represents the average size of products in pints in store i at week t.
This variable primarily measures the average size of a product’s package. We calculated
the average size of all yogurt SKUs to come up with this measure. Larger stores typically
have higher average product size, and they carry more product variety than smaller stores
(e.g., big-box retailers compared to convenience stores). Therefore, we expect
MeanPackageit to be positively correlated with our dependent variable (ConVarit).
AdShareit measures the percentage of yogurt that was on store advertisements (e.g.,
posters) in store i at week t. The display of the products that are advertised may be
different from the display of products that are not advertised. Stores may assign
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additional space to the displayed products to catch the eyes of consumers. This could lead
to a higher number of SKUs displayed in the original shelf space since the advertised
products might be moved to the advertising shelf. Therefore, more unique SKUs may be
sold (or stocked) in a store i with higher AdShareit, in week t.
𝐴𝑑𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 =

𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝐾𝑈𝑠 𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑖 𝑎𝑡 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘 𝑡
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝐾𝑈𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑖 𝑎𝑡 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘 𝑡

DiscountShareit measures the percentage of yogurt that was on sale in store i at week
t. We use this variable to control for promotion-related effects. Promotions may affect the
total variety of the product assortment because promotions may attract more customers
(Lam et al., 2001). Stores may adjust their product assortment decisions based on
customer traffic. Thus, stores with higher DiscountShareit may have higher variety of
products.
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 =

𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝐾𝑈𝑠 𝑜𝑛 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑖 𝑎𝑡 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘 𝑡
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝐾𝑈𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑖 𝑎𝑡 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘 𝑡

TotalQuantityit measures the store i’s total yogurt sale at week t. This variable could
measure two different features of a retailer. First, larger stores will have higher total
quantity of products sold. Second, this variable could represent the speed of sales. If a
store’s products move quickly, the store may have higher demand. Thus, keeping more
SKUs may help the store to achieve a higher fill rate. Therefore, we expect
TotalQuantityit to be positively correlated with conventional product variety.
StoRevit is the annual revenue of store i in all product categories. Since we only have
yearly revenue data, store revenue for a specific store remains the same for all weeks in a
given year. In our study, this variable serves as another proxy for store size. Therefore,
we expect StoRevit to be positively correlated with conventional product variety.
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OMit, CMit, and MMit, respectively, measure the number of organic suppliers,
conventional suppliers, and suppliers that offer both organic and conventional products in
the market where store i operates. These three variables capture the market level
information for a store.
Table 2.1 gives a detailed description and summary statistics for the important
variables in this study. Correlations of all the important variables of this study are given
in Table 2.2.

2.4. ECONOMETRIC MODELS AND ESTIMATION STRATEGY
As discussed earlier, in this research, we assess (1) the impact of introducing organic
products on conventional product variety; and (2) the effect of supply chain power
structure on the relationship between introducing organic products and the conventional
product variety. To make an accurate estimation, we need to benchmark the changes in
conventional product variety of a treatment group against a control group and employ
difference-in-differences analysis. To estimate the impact of introducing organic
products, we compare conventional variety change between stores that introduced
organic products to those that never introduced organic products.
In an ideal scenario, stores should be randomly assigned to the treatment group
(introducing organic products) or the control group (not introducing organic products),
and the treatment should start at the same time for all treatment groups in the treatment
group. However, in our research context, stores choose to introduce organic products, and
they choose to do so at different times. Therefore, we face two methodological issues:
self-selection of treatment group and sliding window for the treatment.
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The self-selection of treatment group may bias the estimation of treatment effect
because stores may decide to introduce organic products based on other unobserved
factors that relate to conventional product variety. For example, stores that want to attract
more consumers may decide to introduce organic products, whereas stores that already
perform well may decide not to introduce organic products. In other words, the average
attributes of stores that introduced organic products may be systematically different from
those who did not introduce organic products. This difference may bias the effect of
treatment if we simply consider the stores that introduced organic products as treatment
group and others as control group. To resolve this potential issue, we apply the propensity
score matching method to construct a control group that is comparable to the treatment
group in terms of the likelihood to introduce organic products before the occurrence of
the actual treatment (Heckman et al. 1997, Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). Because we
have a relatively small number of treated stores (stores that introduced organic products)
compared with the large pool of candidates (stores that never introduced organic
products) for the control group, we specify a 5 nearest-neighbor matching. This
procedure matches each store in the treatment group to 5 stores in the control group based
on store characteristics that may influence the decision of a store to introduce organic
products. The matching ensures that the treatment and control groups are co mparable
before the treatment occurred. The variables we use to match the two groups of retail
stores are average package size of the store (MeanPackage), advertisement share
(AdShare), discount share (DiscountShare), and weekly sales quantity (TotalQuantity).
If the all stores in the treatment group launch organic products at the same time, we
could easily separate the post-treatment periods from the pre-treatment periods and
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compare the average conventional variety changes of the treatment and control groups.
The sliding window of the occurrence of treatment complicates the definition of posttreatment periods for the control group. For example, store A introduced organic products
in the 10th week of 2008, whereas store B introduced organic products in the 20th week
of 2009. It is then not straightforward to define which weeks should be the post-treatment
periods for stores in the control group. To resolve this issue, we define the post-treatment
period of each treated store as the weeks after it introduced organic products, and define
the post-treatment period of each control store the same way as that of the treated store to
which the control store is matched (Rosenbaum & Rubin 1985). For example, if stores C
and D are selected to be the matched controls of stores A and B, respectively, then the
post-treatment period of store C is the 10th week of 2008 and subsequent weeks, and the
post-treatment period of store D is the 20th week of 2009 and subsequent weeks.
2.4.1. PROPENSITY SCORE MATCHING
To assess the effect of introducing organic products, we apply a propensity score
matching model to obtain a control group that could serve as a good counterfactual,
against which we benchmark the conventional product variety change in stores after
introducing organic products. In this model, we use a Probit regression, where the
introduction of organic products is coded as a binary dependent variable. The covariates
include factors that potentially influence the decision to introduce organic products (the
matching variables listed above). Because a store could introduce organic products during
any week in the 208 weeks of our data, we treat each time period as discrete (Sianesi
2004) and perform the propensity score matching in each given week (i.e., 208 times).
More specifically, in each week t, we use the average values of covariates from week 1 to
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week t-1 as independent variables in the matching model (Austin 2011). We specify
model (2.1) for each store i at week t:
Pr(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝑍𝑖𝑡 ) = ɸ(𝑍𝑖𝑡 𝛽), ∀𝑡 = 1, 2, … , 208;

𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑍𝑖𝑡 =

1
𝑡−1

∑𝑡−1
𝑘=1 𝑋𝑖𝑘

(2.1)

where Xik is a vector of all matching variables including MeanPackage, AdShare,
DiscountShare, and TotalQuantity for store i at week t, and Zit is the average of the above
variables from week 1 to week t-1. Since we will use PriLabel, HHI, and StoRev as
indicators of supply chain power and shelf space constraints in our main analysis, we do
not include them in the propensity score matching to avoid multicollinearity issues in our
regression models. Further, we use the nearest-neighbor matching algorithm to select five
control firms that share the closest propensity scores with each treated firm with
replacement. To ensure that the average conventional product variety change of the five
control stores serves as an appropriate counterfactual for that of the corresponding treated
store, we weigh each treated observation by 1 and each control store by sampled
frequency divided by 5 (Hirano et al. 2003, Stuart 2010). For example, if a control store
was assigned to one treated store, its weight is one-fifth; if a control store was assigned to
two treated stores, its weight is two-fifths. We then multiply the dependent variable and
covariates by the assigned weight (Winship & Radbill 1994, Wooldridge 2010) and use
these adjusted values in the difference-in-differences regression.
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Table 2.1: Variable Description
Variable
ConVar
Treat
After
PriLabel
HHI
StoRev
MeanPackage
DiscountShare
AdShare
TotalQuantity
OM
CM
MM

Description
Conventional product variety
Stores that introduced organic products
Treated time for both treatment and control group
Ratio of private-label yogurt SKU to total yogurt SKU
Chain HHI Index
The store total revenue of the year, a proxy of store size
The average package size of yogurt
The percentage of yogurt sold was discounted
The percentage of yogurt sold was advertised
The number of yogurt sold at store
Number of organic product suppliers on the market
Number of conventional product suppliers on the market
Number of mixed product suppliers on the market

Obs.
66281
66281
66281
66281
66281
66281
66281
66281
66281
66281
66281
66281
66281

Mean
52.5378
0.22899
0.62393
0.08825
8.19546
24.0418
0.60617
0.18127
0.01962
684.819
4.22700
12.8822
2.76890

Std. Dev.
63.52492
0.420189
0.484400
0.124820
0.282526
16.92419
0.212650
0.247328
0.068802
1252.966
1.67215
4.99443
1.049969

Min
1
0
0
0
7.27077
0.11
0.25
0
0
1
0
2
0

Table 2.2: Correlation Table
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1 ConVar
1
2 OrgVar
0.677
1
3 PriLabel
0.2474 -0.0699
1
4 HHI
-0.4601 -0.3572 -0.0375
1
5 MeanPackage 0.5519 0.2041 0.6051 -0.1513
1
6 DiscountShare 0.2184 0.0284 0.1951 -0.098 0.2154
1
7 AdShare
0.2599 0.1129 0.2189 -0.055 0.1954 0.4723
1
8 TotalQuantity
0.6143 0.6827 0.1057 -0.2408 0.2851 0.0904 0.1625
1
9 StoRev
0.6263 0.6457 0.2225 -0.2187 0.3999 0.0447 0.1033 0.8832
Notes. Bold denotes significance at p < .05 level.
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9

1

Max
347
1
1
1
9.21034
146.241
1.313043
1
0.861111
14380
9
38
6

2.4.2. DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS
2.4.2.1 THE EFFECT OF INTRODUCING ORGANIC PRODUCTS
To assess the effect of introducing organic products on conventional product variety,
we use a difference-in-differences regression. The main dependent variable is the variety
of conventional product (ConVar) and the independent variables are binary treatment
indicator of Treat and the binary indicator of the post-treatment After. We are interested
in the interaction term of the above two binary variables. Conventional product variety
could also be affected by unobserved store characteristics and market conditions.
Therefore, we further control for organic supplier in the market (OM), conventional
supplier in the market (CM), and mixed supplier in the market as our control (MM). We
use a fixed effects model to control for non-time varying variables. Equation (2.2),
below, shows the main model that estimates the effect of introducing organic product
variety on conventional product variety.
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 ∗ 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝜸𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝜌𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

(2.2)

where i indexes store and t indexes week. X denotes the vector of control variables,
including PriLabel, HHI, StoRev, OM, CM, and MM. δt denotes dummies for time-fixed
effects, λi denotes dummies for store fixed effects, and εit is the error term. By controlling
for both time and store fixed effects, we are able to account for all time invariant effects
such as geographic area and store type as well as for any seasonal effects on product
assortment decisions.
2.4.2.2 THE EFFECT OF SUPPLY CHAIN POWER
To assess the effect of how supply chain power affects the relationship between
introducing organic products and the variety of conventional products, we further include
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the interaction of the supply chain power variables with the interaction of Treat and After
and assess the three-way interaction terms. Specifically, Equation (2.3) and Equation
(2.4) show the interaction effect of supplier concentration (HHI) and the effect of privatelabel ratio (PlRatio), respectively.
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 ∗ 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝜸𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝜌𝑖 +

(2.3)

𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑃𝑙𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑃𝑙𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 ∗ 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝜸𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝜌𝑖 +

(2.4)

𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

2.4.2.2 THE EFFECT OF STORE SIZE CONSTRAINT
As discussed earlier, we use annual store revenue (StoRev) as the proxy of store size
in our data. Similar to 2.4.2.2, we use the three-way interaction term among Treat, After
and StoRev to assess the effect of how store size constraint would affect the relationship
between introducing organic products and the variety of conventional products. Equation
(2.5) below presents our model.
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 ∗ 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝜸𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝜌𝑖 +

(2.5)

𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

We acknowledge that annual store revenue (StoRev) may not be the perfect measure
for store size; therefore, we perform additional validations in the extension section 2.6.4.

2.5. RESULTS
First, we report the results regarding the effect of introducing organic products and
how supply chain power affects this relationship. Next, we check the robustness of our
results.
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2.5.1. MAIN RESULTS
The difference-in-differences regression estimates of Equation (2.2) are reported in
Table 2.3. First, we find that introducing organic products increases the conventional
product variety (β3= 11.59, p < .01). We also find that, through the three-way interaction,
that stores with higher private-label ratio have lower conventional product variety after
introducing organic products (β4= -49.94, p < .05), while larger stores have higher
conventional product variety after introducing organic products (β4= 0.740, p < .05). The
moderating effect of supplier concentration is not significant in our current model. We
believe that this may be driven by the fact that the majority of our treatment stores source
from existing suppliers when they first introduced organic products, and only a small
portion of our treatment stores acquired a new supplier when they first introduced organic
products. Sourcing from a new supplier may send out signals to existing suppliers that
threatens the dependency of the retailer on the suppliers. Therefore, stores that already
have less concentrated supplier (lower HHI) base would gain more negotiation power
from introducing organic products and push for more conventional product variety from
the existing conventional suppliers. On the other hand, sourcing from existing suppliers
does not send out a signal of threatening the dependency on existing suppliers, therefore
supplier concentration does not play a significant role in this case. To separate these two
groups, we further perform two sets of analyses where we either keep treatment stores
that used new suppliers (12 stores), or treatment stores that did not use new suppliers (69
stores). We first apply the same propensity score matching process on the 12 treatment
stores that used new suppliers with all 431 control stores, and re-run Models (2.2) to
(2.5). We then perform another propensity score matching on the 69 stores that did not
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use new suppliers with the same 431 control stores, and again re-run Models (2.2) to
(2.5). Table 4 shows the result of these two sets of analyses. We could see that (“New
Supplier” tab, (results (6)) stores with higher HHI have lower conventional product
variety after introducing organic products (β4= -31.78, p < .01). On the other hand, stores
that did not use new supplies ( “Existing Supplier” tab, result (11)) do not exhibit this
effect.
2.5.2. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
We made changes in our propensity score matching process to see if our results are
robust. First, we use three and one nearest neighbor matching instead of five nearest
neighbors. For three nearest neighbor matching, we find consistent treatment effect (β3=
13.69, p < .01), private-label ratio (β4= - 59.41, p < .05), and store size effect (β4= 0. 93, p
< .01). For one nearest neighbor matching, we also find consistent treatment effect (β3=
13.97, p < .01), private-label ratio (β4= -56.57, p < .05), and store size effect (β4= 0.94, p
< .01). Although HHI effect is not significant using the full sample for three and one
nearest neighbor matching as well, we find consistent effect of HHI when using the
subsample of the 12 stores that used new suppliers for both three nearest neighbor
matching (β4= -23.66, p < .05) and one nearest neighbor matching (β4= -24.47, p < .1).
Second, because our matching results in the main analysis may depend on the
matching sequence, which starts the matching from week 1 up to week 208. Thus, it is
possible that the quality of the matches declines in later weeks. Therefore, we may have a
biased control group for the treatment stores that introduced organic products in the later
phase of our time span. To ensure that our results are not affected by this potential bias,
we rematch the treatment group and control group using reverse-time sequence (week
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208 to 1). Our results show consistent effect of treatment effect (β3= 10.80, p < .01),
private-label ratio effect (β4= -58.15, p < .05), and store size effect (β4= 0.90, p < .1).

2.6. EXTENSIONS
In the main analysis, we examined the impact of introducing organic products on
conventional product variety. As a first extension, using instrumental variables
regression, we study the impact of increasing organic product variety on conventional
product variety in Section 2.6.1 below.
6.1. ECONOMETRIC MODELS AND ESTIMATION STRATEGY
Equation (2.6), below, shows the model that estimates the effect of organic product
variety on conventional product variety
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑂𝑟𝑔𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝜸𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝜆𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

(2.6)

where i indexes store and t indexes week. OrgVarit represents the number of organic
SKUs in store i at week t. In order to test the relationship between organic product variety
and conventional product variety at the store level, we calculated the number of SKUs of
organic yogurt sold in store i at week t as our main independent variable. X denotes the
vector of control variables, as described above in Section 2.3.2.3. As before, δt denotes
dummies for time-fixed effects, λi denotes dummies for store-fixed effects, and εit is the
error term.
In our study, the number of organic yogurt SKUs (OrgVarit) may not be an
exogenous variable because a manager may carry a specific amount of variety of organic
products on the basis of certain store and product characteristics that we are unable to
observe. In addition, store managers may decide on their organic product offerings based
on conventional product offerings. Therefore, there may be a reverse causal relationship
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between organic product variety and conventional product variety. In order to control for
these potential endogeneity issues, we use a two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression to
estimate Equation (2.6) above. In particular, we use the number of organic suppliers in
the store as an instrument for organic product variety. Conceptually, organic products are
supplied by organic product suppliers; therefore, the number of organic suppliers a store
has relationship with could affect organic product variety. Thus, it satisfies the relevance
requirement of an instrument variable. On the other hand, since organic suppliers do not
have control on what conventional products are supplied to the store, the number of
organic suppliers would not directly impact conventional product variety that a store
offers. Thus, the exclusion requirement of an instrumental variable is also met.
We use fixed effects 2SLS panel data analysis, with standard errors clustered at the
retail-chain level, to test the effect of organic product variety on conventional product
variety. We cluster our standard errors at the retail-chain level because stores within the
same chain may undertake similar operations, and therefore, the observations gathered
from the same retail chain may be correlated. As explained above, the store fixed effects
control for all time-invariant unobserved variables, such as store location and store size,
and the time fixed effects control for seasonality.
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Table 2.3: Main Results

Variable Names
After
Treat*After

(1)
ConVar

(2)
ConVar

(3)
ConVar

(4)
ConVar

-4.544***
(1.024)
11.59***
(2.855)

-11.51
(17.21)
-55.78
(95.21)
-53.43***
(14.55)
0.909
(2.024)
8.099
(11.68)

-5.097***
(1.107)
17.07***
(4.885)

-6.409***
(1.386)
-2.016
(3.267)

Treat*HHI
After*HHI
Treat*After*HHI
Treat*PlRatio

-11.27
(37.05)
27.83***
(8.951)
-49.94**
(20.50)

After*PlRatio
Treat*After*PlRatio
Treat*StoRev
After*StoRev
Treat*After*StoRev
HHI
PlRatio
StoRev
OM
CM
MM

-0.682
(6.286)
-59.65*
(34.00)
0.149
(0.656)
-0.892
(0.631)
-2.377***
(0.415)
-0.144
(0.760)

2.952
(3.708)
-64.08*
(33.27)
-0.0637
(0.759)
-0.757
(0.688)
-2.046***
(0.381)
-0.169
(0.776)

-1.001
(6.463)
-70.66*
(37.51)
0.0186
(0.623)
-0.917
(0.667)
-2.253***
(0.417)
-0.115
(0.732)

1.357
(4.285)
0.309**
(0.148)
0.740**
(0.296)
0.214
(6.072)
-58.58*
(33.01)
-1.563
(4.314)
-0.601
(0.633)
-2.176***
(0.394)
-0.137
(0.772)

Observations
48,446
48,446
48,446
48,446
R-squared
0.329
0.356
0.340
0.349
Number of iri_key
302
302
302
302
Store/Week FE
YES
YES
YES
YES
Notes. * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Clustered Robust Standard errors in parenthesis.
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Table 2.4: Introducing Organic Products from A New Supplier

VARIABLES
Treat*After
Treat*After*HHI
Treat*After*PlRatio

(5)
ConVar
6.526*
(3.781)

New Supplier
(6)
(7)
ConVar
ConVar
265.3***
19.29*
(64.04)
(10.52)
***
-31.7
(7.819)
-62.26*
(33.06)

(8)
ConVar
11.50
(7.693)

(9)
ConVar
11.17***
(3.548)

Existing Supplier
(10)
(11)
ConVar
ConVar
-94.22
16.12***
(107.1)
(5.797)
12.75
(13.15)
-47.69*
(24.15)

(12)
ConVar
-5.243
(3.802)

-0.542
0.874***
(0.424)
(0.258)
**
**
**
**
**
***
***
PlRatio
-72.34
-71.81
-88.45
-71.86
-64.37
-67.9
-67.4
-61.11**
(28.38)
(28.23)
(34.43)
(28.52)
(24.09)
(23.00)
(18.69)
(22.77)
StoRev
1.533
1.668
1.727
0.572
0.609
0.478
0.460
0.493
(2.589)
(2.540)
(2.591)
(2.647)
(0.509)
(0.603)
(0.516)
(2.987)
HHI
-0.0559
-0.500
-0.500
0.530
0.179
4.561
-0.355
0.926
(7.284)
(5.845)
(7.193)
(7.051)
(6.516)
(3.744)
(6.668)
(6.438)
Observations
23,046
23,046
23,046
23,046
45,753
45,753
45,753
45,753
R-squared
0.354
0.362
0.364
0.357
0.334
0.361
0.349
0.360
Number of Store
143
143
143
143
279
279
279
279
Store/Week FE
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
Notes. * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Clustered Robust Standard errors in parenthesis. Some variables are omitted for brevity.
Treat*After*StoRev
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Equation (2.7), shown below, is used to test the moderating effect of private-label on
the relationship of organic product variety with conventional product variety. Thus, the
coefficient of the interaction term becomes our variable of interest.
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑂𝑟𝑔𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑂𝑟𝑔𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝜸𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝜆𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

(2.7)

It should be noted that the interaction term may be endogenous because of the
potential endogeneity of organic product variety, as explained above. We use additional
instrumental variables to address the endogeneity of the interaction variable. In particular,
we use the interaction of PriLabelit with the instrumental variable (number of organic
suppliers) as an instrument for the interaction variable (Wooldridge, 2010). Therefore, we
use two instruments for two potentially endogenous variables (OrgVarit and OrgVarit*
PriLabelit).
Equation (2.8), given below, tests the moderating effect of the HHI.
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑂𝑟𝑔𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑂𝑟𝑔𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝜸𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝜆𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

(2.8)

Similar to the estimation of Equation (7), we use two instrumental variables for two
potentially endogenous variables (OrgVarit and OrgVarit *HHIit).
2.6.2. RESULTS FOR INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES REGRESSION
We performed VIF tests to check for potential multicollinearity issues. We find that
the VIFs for MeanPackage and TotalQuantity are 48.31 and 10.45, respectively. As the
high VIF scores raise concern for multicollinearity, we dropped these two control
variables (MeanPackage and TotalQuantity) and reran our analysis. The mean VIF after
dropping these two variables is 4.30 and no variable VIF exceeds the value of 10.
Therefore, multicollinearity is no longer a concern in our model.
Table 2.5 (result (13)) shows that the effect of organic product variety on
conventional product variety is positive and highly significant (β1= 0.9708, p < .01),
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which suggests that an increase in organic product variety is associated with an increase
in conventional product variety in stores. In addition, we translate the coefficient to
elasticity by 𝑒 = 𝛽 ∗ 𝑋𝑌 . Using the average values of organic product variety and
conventional product variety for X and Y, respectively and using β1= 0.9708, the
elasticity of our model is 0.094. This implies that conventional product variety increases,
on average, by 0.094% for a 1% increase in organic product variety.
Table 2.5, Result (14), shows a negative coefficient (β3= -3.9745, p < .01) of the
interaction term between organic product variety and the private-label ratio. Thus, the
private-label ratio negatively moderates the association between organic product variety
and conventional product variety. The total effect of organic product variety on
conventional product variety in stores that hold private-label products is β1+ β3*
PriLabelit. When the private-label variety ratio is less than 41.8% (i.e., 1.6628-3.9745 *
PriLabelit = 0 and PriLabelit = 0.418), additional organic product variety would increase
conventional product variety in the store. However, if the private-label variety ratio is
greater than 41.8%, increasing organic product variety would lead to a decrease in
conventional product variety. To further illustrate this finding, we plot the marginal
effects of organic product variety. As shown in Figure 2.3, the average marginal effect of
organic product variety decreases as the private-label ratio increases. The average
marginal effect of organic product variety even becomes negative when the private-label
ratio exceeds 0.418. As a further example, consider two stores: each with 30 organic
product SKUs. One store has a private-label product ratio of 35% while the other has a
private-label ratio of 45% (see Figure 2.4). When both stores increase their organic
product SKUs from 30 to 60, we can see that the number of conventional product SKUs
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in the second store decreases. This is because retail stores would prioritize both organic
products and their store brands over branded conventional products. We discuss this
effect further in Section 2.6.5.
Table 2.5: Instrumental Variable Regression
(13)
ConVar
0.9708***
(0.1096)

(14)
(15)
ConVar
ConVar
1.6628*** 23.519***
(0.1923)
(1.1632)
-3.9745***
(0.7939)
-111.81*** -81.232*** -126.46***
(7.6247)
(9.8355)
(7.9874)
-2.8761***
(0.1453)
-4.7025*
-5.6601** 15.479***
(2.4093)
(2.4006)
(1.9414)
1.3859*** 1.2929***
0.8366*
(0.4484)
(0.4347)
(0.4512)
-0.8681**
-0.8386*
-0.3684
(0.4396)
(0.4348)
(0.3896)
0.6611
0.3881
1.4267**
(0.6404)
(0.6345)
(0.6433)

Variable Names
OrgVar
OrgVar*PriLabel
PriLabel
OrgVar*HHI
HHI
StoRev
DiscountShare
AdShare

Observations
307,688
307,688
307,688
R-squared
0.119
0.138
0.173
Number of Store
1,887
1,887
1,887
Store FE
YES
YES
YES
Week Dummy
YES
YES
YES
Notes. * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Clustered Robust Standard errors in parenthesis.
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Figure 2.3: The Marginal Effect of Organic Variety
When Private-label Ratio Increases
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Figure 2.4: The Moderating Effect of Private-label
Table 2.5, Result (15), shows a negative coefficient (β3= -2.8761, p < .01) of the
interaction term between organic product variety and retail-chain HHI. When the revenue
of a retail chain is highly concentrated with a few manufacturers, the manufacturers have
more power on deciding a store’s SKU offerings. As a result, retail chains offer fewer
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conventional product SKUs when introducing organic product SKUs, and manufacturers
save on operating costs by managing fewer SKUs. On the other hand, when a retail chain
is less concentrated, the retailers have more power deciding on their product variety
offerings. They choose to offer more SKUs to attract more customers and generate higher
revenue. Again, to illustrate this finding graphically, we plot the marginal effects of
organic product variety when the HHI increases. As shown in Figure 2.5, when the HHI
increases, the marginal effect of organic product variety decreases. The average marginal
effect of organic product variety becomes negative when HHI is higher than 8.17 (i.e.,
23.519-2.8761 *HHI= 0 and HHI= 8.17).
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Figure 2.5: The Marginal Effect of Organic Variety When HHI Increases
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Figure 2.6: The Marginal Effect of Organic Variety When Store Size Increases

2.6.3. STORE SIZE AS A CONSTRAINT
We have showed that conventional product variety is positively associated with
organic product variety, which supports the notion of a stronger market-expansion effect
of organic product growth rather than a cost-efficiency effect. However, the market
expansion effect is not necessarily in conflict with the cost-efficiency effect. In fact, the
cost-efficiency effect becomes dominant when capacity constraints are sufficiently tight,
in which case organic product and conventional product variety cannot continue to grow
at the same time. Given the limited shelf space available to display yogurt, smaller stores
are constrained by the number of SKUs (organic or conventional) that they can carry on
their shelves. Larger stores have more space and therefore have more flexibility in adding
SKUs. The previous analysis controls for store revenue as a proxy for store size or
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capacity. The positive relationship between organic product and conventional product
variety, however, may be an artifact of our dataset having a large number of stores that
are less constrained for capacity. In order to further examine the relationship between
organic product and conventional product variety under capacity constraints, we consider
an interaction term between store annual revenue (StoRev) and organic product variety
(OrgVar). We recognize that store revenue is not a perfect measure for store size.
However, we believe that larger stores generally would have higher revenues than
smaller stores. We start our analysis using the full sample and use store annual revenue
(StoRev) as a proxy for shelf space. Again, as in section 2.6.1, we use the same two
instruments for the two potentially endogenous variables, and we employ 2SLS
estimation. Result (16) of Table 2.6 shows the full sample coefficients. However, the
interaction coefficient (β3= 0.018, p = .27) is only qualitatively positive. One scenario
that compromises the relationship between store size and revenue is market size and
demand. For example, a smaller store located in a high population density area may have
greater annual revenue than a larger store located in a low population density area. To
alleviate this concern, we develop a subsample with similar market sizes to reduce the
impact of differences in store traffic. Specifically, we identify the five most populated
areas in our dataset: New York, Philadelphia, Washington, D.C., Chicago, and Los
Angeles. The sizes of these markets are comparable. The results from the first subsample
are compared with those from the full sample, and are shown in Results (17) of Table 6.
We find that the interaction term (β3= 0.01625, p < .1) is positively correlated with
conventional yogurt variety. To illustrate it graphically, we plot the marginal effects of
organic product variety as store revenue increases. As shown in Figure 2.6, when store
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revenue increases, the average marginal effect of organic product variety also increases.
Finally, we also develop subsamples based on store revenue, with the bottom 5% of
stores. In the bottom 5% stores, there are 178 stores with an average annual revenue of
2.52 (million $), ranging from 0.11 to 3.35 (million $). We use 2SLS estimation to
analyze the impact of organic product variety on conventional product variety. Table 7,
results (18) show the correlation (β1= -1.118, p < .01) is negative. We also perform
similar analysis for our diff-in-diff sample where we kept only bottom 5% of treatment
stores (3 treatment stores) with all control stores and use diff-in-diff analysis with
propensity score matching. Table 2.7, results (19) show that the interaction term between
Treat and After is negative, which is consistent with the instrument variables estimation.
Together, these findings indicate that smaller stores have significant space constraints
that would not allow them to increase conventional product variety. These results
reconcile our main result finding a positive relationship between organic product variety
and conventional product variety with the more conventional, capacity-based
cannibalization argument.
2.6.4. BRANDED CONVENTIONAL PRODUCT VARIETY VS. PRIVATE-LABEL CONVENTIONAL
PRODUCT VARIETY
Previously, we had shown that conventional yogurt variety decreases as organic
yogurt variety increases in stores that have a strong presence of private-label products. In
this section, we perform two additional analyses to further examine this relationship. In
particular, we generate two variables: BrdConVarit and PriConVarit.
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Table 2.6: Five largest markets versus full sample
(16)
(17)
Variable Names
ConVar
ConVar
OrgVar
0.4411
0.7675
(0.4695)
(0.4752)
OrgVar*StoRev
0.01800
0.01625*
(0.01646)
(0.008394)
PlRatio
-110.68***
-112.14**
(24.144)
(49.865)
HHI
-4.9663
-1.4389
(18.073)
(22.090)
DiscountShare
-0.8172
0.4950
(1.4863)
(2.3335)
AdShare
0.6305
-3.4741
(2.4297)
(2.1412)
StoRev
0.8109
3.8301
(0.8869)
(5.1476)
Observations
307,688
85,009
R-squared
0.124
0.087
Number of iri_key
1,887
537
Store/Week FE
YES
YES
Notes. * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Clustered Robust Standard errors in parenthesis.
Table 2.7: Bottom 5% Store Size
(18)
ConVar
-1.118***
(0.0983)

Variable Names
OrgVar
Treat*After

(19)
ConVar

-1.850***
(0.275)
-0.614
(0.319)
9.785***
(0.239)
-2.229
(6.680)
20,175
0.087
142
YES
YES

HHI

-0.164*
(0.0856)
PlRatio
5.078***
(0.348)
StoRev
1.074
(0.702)
Observations
15,917
R-squared
0.299
Number of iri_key
187
Store FE
YES
Week Dummy
YES
(Some Control Variables Are Omitted for Brevity)
Notes. * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Clustered Robust Standard errors in parenthesis.
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The former represents the number of branded conventional product variety that store
i carries at week t, and the latter represents the number of private-label conventional
product variety that store i carries at week t. We estimate these two additional analyses
using Model (6) and change the dependent variable to BrdConVarit and PriConVarit,
accordingly. The results are shown in Table 2.8 (Results (20) and (21), respectively). In
Result (20), we can see that the interaction term between organic product variety and
private-label ratio, β3= -7.773 (p < .01), is negative. Thus, the private-label ratio
negatively moderates the correlation between organic product variety and branded
conventional product variety. The total effect of organic product variety on branded
conventional product variety in stores that hold private-label product is β1+β3 *
PrivateLabelit. When the private-label variety ratio is less than 28.2% (i.e., 2.194-7.773 *
PrivateLabelit = 0, and PrivateLabelit = 0.282), additional organic product variety would
increase branded conventional product variety in the store. However, if the private-label
variety ratio is greater than 28.2%, increasing organic product variety would lead to a
decrease in branded conventional product variety. However, in Result (21), we see a
different effect on private-label conventional yogurt. The interaction term between
organic product variety and the private-label ratio, β_3= 2.158 (p < .01), is positive.
Thus, the private-label ratio positively moderates the correlation between organic product
variety and private-label conventional product variety. The total effect of organic product
variety on branded conventional product variety in stores that hold private-label product
is β1+β3 * PrivateLabelit. When the private-label variety ratio is higher than 9.4% (i.e., 0.203+2.158 * PrivateLabelit = 0 and PrivateLabelit = 0.094), additional organic product
variety would increase private-label conventional product variety in the store. And only
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when the private-label variety ratio is less than 9.4%, additional organic product variety
would decrease private-label conventional product variety in the store. These additional
analyses point to the fact that retailers with strong private-label presence tend to reduce
branded conventional product variety when increasing organic product variety.
Table 2.8: Private or Branded Conventional Variety

Variables
OrgVar
OrgVar*PriLabel
PriLabel
DiscountShare
AdShare
StoRev

(20)
BrdConVar

(21)
PriConVar

2.1937***
(0.384)
-7.7725***
(2.071)
-165.31***
(20.199)
-1.7408
(1.943)
8.615e-04***
(2.945e-04)
1.2197**
(0.108)

-0.2033***
(0.065)
2.1577***
(0.408)
66.610***
(14.368)
0.2490
(0.554)
1.081e-04*
(6.197e-05)
0.01947
(0.104)

Observations
246,659
246,659
R-squared
0.279
0.378
Number of Store
1,540
1,540
Store FE
YES
YES
Time FE
YES
YES
Notes. * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Clustered Robust Standard errors in parenthesis.

2.6.5. GREEK YOGURT AND ALL-NATURAL YOGURT SUBCATEGORIES
Another concern associated with our results is that, instead of organic products,
there may be other trendy products that spike conventional product variety in our study
period. In this section, we aim to rule out such a possibility. During our time period of
study, the rapid growth of organic yogurt coincided with the launch and soaring
popularity of Greek yogurt and All-Natural yogurt. The varieties of these two

55

subcategories increased significantly during the same time. A natural possibility could be
that if Greek yogurt and All-Natural yogurt are mostly conventional products, then the
increase in conventional yogurt variety might be a result associated with the popularity of
these two subcategories, rather than because of the increase in organic yogurt variety. To
rule out this alternative explanation, we control for product variety of these two
subcategories, and re-estimate the previous models. Because Greek yogurt and AllNatural yogurt are available as conventional and organic yogurts, we use the number of
organic yogurt SKUs, excluding those for Greek yogurt and All-Natural yogurt to avoid
multicollinearity issues (see Equations (2.9) and (2.10), respectively). The results are
given in Table 2.9 (see Results (22) and (23)). We find that after controlling for the
variety of these subcategories, organic product variety is still positively associated with
conventional product variety (β1= 0.657, p < .01 and γ1= 1.047, p < .01). We further find
that the effect size of Non-Greek organic yogurt is 0.058, indicating that conventional
yogurt variety increases 0.058% when Non-Greek organic yogurt variety increases 1%.
Similarly, the effect size of Non-Natural organic yogurt is 0.097, indicating that
conventional yogurt variety increases 0.097% when Non-Natural organic yogurt variety
increases 1%.
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑂𝑟𝑔𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐺𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐺𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝝈𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝜆𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1 𝑂𝑟𝑔𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾3 𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝝈𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝜆𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

(2.9)
(2.10)

These results indicate that while the emergence of new yogurt categories contributes
to the increase in conventional product variety, the positive relationship between organic
and conventional product variety remains significant.
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Table 2.9: Alternative Explanation: Greek Yogurt and All-Natural Yogurt
(22)
ConVar
0.657***
(0.131)
1.002***
(0.078)

Variables
OrgNonGreekVar
GreekVar
OrgNonNaturalVar

(23)
ConVar

1.047***
(0.124)
0.547*
(0.323)
307,697
0.519
1,896
YES
YES

NaturalVar

Observations
307,697
R-squared
0.658
Number of Store
1,896
Store FE
YES
Week Dummy
YES
(Some Control Variables Are Omitted for Brevity)
Notes. * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Clustered Robust Standard errors in parenthesis.

2.6.6. DOES HIGHER PRODUCT VARIETY LEAD TO GREATER SALES?
While our main analysis provides solid support for our main results, it does not
address the possibility that the increases in product variety may not be accompanied by
increases in sales. In such case, the pie is indeed larger, but it is also thinner because
larger number of customers may not result in additional sales. To test this, we focus on
the category revenue of yogurt products. Category revenue has been studied in the past
literature (e.g., Perdikaki et al., 2012). Note that changes in yogurt revenue may be driven
by the potential upward trend in consumer demand for yogurt products, which is
measured by the per capita consumption of yogurt (YPCC) . We control for this trend
using the per capita consumption of yogurt (YPCC) in the United States from 2008 to
2011 (in pounds per person, retrieved from the Statista Portal). After controlling for
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YPCC, we test the relationship between organic product variety (and conventional
product variety) and store-level yogurt sales.
𝑌𝑜𝑔𝑢𝑟𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑂𝑟𝑔𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑌𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

(2.11)

We present our findings in Table 2.10, Result (24). As can be gleaned from this
table, both organic product variety (β_1= 16.67, p < .01) and conventional product
variety (β_2= 4.009, p < .05) are positively correlated with yogurt revenue. The effect
size of organic variety and conventional variety are 0.04 and 0.10, respectively. These
results indicate that a 1% variety increase in organic products will lead to 0.04% increase
in store yogurt sales, while 1% variety increase in conventional products will lead to
0.1% increase in store yogurt sales.

Table 2.10: Store Traffic Extension
(24)
YogurtRevenue
4.009**
(1.617)
16.67***
(3.628)
66.16
(61.948)
206,719
1,263
0.926
YES
YES

Variables
ConVar
OrgVar
YPCC

Observations
Number of Store
R-squared
Store FE
Week Dummy
(Some Control Variables Are Omitted for Brevity)
Notes. * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Clustered Robust Standard errors in parenthesis.
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2.7. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
In this study, we seek to address two questions: (1) Does conventional product
variety increase or decrease when organic product is introduced (or organic product
variety increases)? (2) Does the control of assortment decisions in the supply chain affect
assortments between organic and conventional products? Our findings show that
introducing organic products will result in an increase of conventional product variety.
This positive relationship between organic product introduction and conventional product
variety is largely attributed to the growing segment of organic product consumers. These
organic product customers are not only drawn to stores that start introducing or
increasing their existing organic product offerings, but they will also likely purchase
conventional products that are attractive to them during their shopping trips. It is also
important to note that an increase in conventional product variety is not indefinite. Our
main finding suggests that the market expansion effect of organic products largely
outweighs the increases in operational costs for average retailers. However, we also show
that stores that face limited shelf-space resources tend to reduce conventional product
variety to make room for organic products when they introduce or expand their organic
product offerings. This is consistent with the literature that suggests that product
assortment is constrained by the space available in stores (Corstjens & Doyle, 1981).
Extending our findings to include the supply chain relationship effects, we also find
that when manufacturers are more concentrated, and therefore more powerful in the
supply chain and have control over product assortment decisions, stores tend to have a
less positive relationship between organic product and conventional product variety. This
finding supports the theoretical result that powerful manufacturers may strategically
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reduce product variety to reduce costs (Inderst & Shaffer 2007). Similarly, when retailers
are more powerful with a strong private-label presence (Dunne & Narasimhan, 1999;
Narasimhan & Wilcox, 1998; Quelch & Harding, 1996), they tend to reduce branded
conventional products and increase private-label conventional products when introducing
organic products. This suggests that retailers further leverage their store brands and
supply chain control in their assortment decisions, leading to asymmetric effects of
organic products on conventional product variety. Taken together, these findings suggest
that retailers tend to increase conventional product offerings with the introduction of
organic products, as long as they have enough capacity and have control over the supply
chain.
2.7.1. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS
Retail store operations face a variety of novel challenges and complexities (Mou et
al., 2018). Our research contributes to the product assortment literature by empirically
examining the impact of an emerging product type—organic products—on retailer
product assortment decisions. Increasing product variety generally has two effects on
retail operations. On the one hand, there is the revenue effect from better market
segmentation, by attracting new and variety seeking consumers (Bayus & Putsis, 1999;
Ton & Raman, 2010; Xia & Rajagopalan, 2009). However, retailers should also be aware
of the cannibalization effects as product variety increases (Quelch & Kenny, 1994). This
happens when a product in a certain category may cannibalize consumer demand of
another product in the same category. Our results indicate that, organic products, thanks
to their specialized group of customers, stimulate the demand for a variety of
conventional products within the same category. Therefore, introducing and increasing
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organic product offerings are different from traditional decisions pertaining to product
line extensions. On the other hand, there is the cost effect associated with operations
increasing product variety (Mantrala et al., 2009; Shockley et al., 2015). We also confirm
that the cost effect is significant when retailers face strict shelf space constraints, as well
as when the market expansion effect is subject to capacity constraints (Hamilton &
Richards, 2009).
In addition, manufacturers bear much higher cost from increasing product variety
compared to retailers (Kekre & Srinivasan, 1990; Fisher & Ittner, 1999), and in
particular, with respect to organic products (Chang & Schuster, 2002). Therefore, as
organic products continue to gain momentum in the market, the governance and control
in the organic product supply chain become more important for retailer assortment
decisions. We contribute to the literature by empirically examining the effect of organic
supply chain governance and control on retailer-manufacturer product assortment
decisions. In particular, we consider supply chains that contain a concentrated group of
manufacturers or a retailer with strong private-label presence. We show that these two
mechanisms lead to different results for conventional product variety. With a smaller,
concentrated manufacturer group, the retailer has less power and control over product
assortment decisions. We show that a manufacturer’s concerns of cost efficiency
associated with organic products have a stronger effect on retailer assortment decisions,
thereby mitigating the market expansion effect for manufacturer brands. Moreover, we
show that retailers with a strong private-label presence may leverage the pattern of
expansion of organic product variety as an opportunity to increase their private-label
conventional products and reduce their reliance on national brand conventional product
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variety. Prior research on private-label products mostly focuses on product and service
quality, customer loyalty, store differentiation, and store profitability in the context of
supply chain governance and control (Ailawadi et al., 2008; Chintagunta et al., 2002;
Corstjens & Lal, 2000; Martos-Partal & González-Benito, 2011). In contrast, we
empirically show that private-label products also play a role in supply chain relationship
through the retailers’ assortment planning decisions. Our finding of retailers switching
national brand conventional products with private-label products when introducing
organic products is consistent with other studies. For example, Alan et al. (2017), found
that retailers would protect their private-label products by reducing competing national
branded product assortments. We build further on Alan et al.’s (2017) work by showing
that retailers will strategically use organic product expansion as an opportunity to
strengthen their private-label product portfolio as well. Taken together, these findings
suggest that the growth of organic products is demand-driven and motivated by an
increasing variety-seeking customer base, which stimulates an assortment involving a
higher variety of conventional product offerings. However, the supply-driven constraints
and cost implications in the supply chain significantly affect this relationship as well.
This is true especially when manufacturers have more power to influence product
assortment decisions.
2.7.2. MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS
In addition to the contributions to theory, this study has managerial implications as
well. For retailers that have not yet launched organic products on their shelves, this study
points to the benefit of overall store sales from the introduction of organic products.
Retailers could use organic products to attract new variety-seeking consumers, who could
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also buy conventional products as well. This way stores are also encouraged to add
variety for conventional products also. Increasing both organic product variety and
conventional variety will result in higher category level sales. To be more specific, our
results show that a 1% increase in organic product variety could lead to a 0.04% increase
in total category sales. Similarly, by increasing conventional product variety by 1%
would lead to a 0.1% increase in total category sales. As the contingent nature of our
findings indicate, it is not a “free lunch,” that is, there is a tapering off effect of further
increasing product variety. First, the limited shelf space may limit retailers’ ability to
further increase total product variety. In such cases, retailers will have to switch some of
their low-performing conventional products with organic products. Another constraint
comes from the supplier side: a concentrated supplier base also hinders retailers from
increasing total product variety. Because increasing product variety increases costs for
manufacturers more than for retailers, such factors should be carefully considered when
deciding on the optimal mix of organic product variety in comparison to variety of
conventional products. On the flip side, if retailers face adverse power from
manufacturers, they can respond by introducing private-label brands. Because privatelabel products help retailers gain customer loyalty, introducing private-label products
would enhance retailers’ power in the supply chain. In addition, retailers that already
have private-label products can further enhance their power in the supply chain by
substituting national brand conventional products with private-label conventional
products as they attempt to increase organic product variety. As a result, retailers could
introduce their private-label products to the newly acquired organic product customers
and gain loyalty from these organic product customers. Viewed from a manufacturer’s
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perspective, by facing the growing pressure of supplying organic products and meeting
retailers’ demand for more variety in conventional products, manufacturers should invest
in clear product differentiation of their national brands (for organic and conventional
products) so that customers can be wooed away from the retail stores’ organic or privatelabel brands. In addition, since producing both conventional products and organic
products may be costly, manufacturers could consider mergers and acquisitions with
small organic product producers, thereby increasing their overall product portfolios.
2.7.3. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
Our study is not without limitations. First, we should note that organic consumers
also purchasing conventional products may be driven by the fact that organic product
supply is still limited. Therefore, many product variants are available only in
conventional product forms. As organic production gets more generalized, organic
consumers may become more exclusive in their purchasing patterns of organic products.
If this is the case, we may see a decrease in the positive correlation between organic
product and conventional product variety in the future. However, as the supply of organic
products is still very limited today, we do not expect such effects to diminish in the near
future. Second, we did not have a precise measure for shelf space. Although using store
revenue is a reasonable proxy for shelf space, future research could use actual shelf space
data to understand to what extent shelf space constrains the growth of conventional
products. Third, we use only yogurt data to study the effects of organic product growth
on conventional products due to the limitation of our data source. As organic products
become less expensive to consumers, future research could use more product categories
and see if the balance between product expansion and cost efficiency is different across
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product categories. Fourth, our sample is limited to the United States of America.
European countries have a slightly more mature organic market, while Asian countries
have just begun to introduce organic products into the retail market in a formal manner.
Future research with data from different countries and regions may provide richer
insights into how organic products perform differently across global regions. Finally, we
did not have data on all organic product manufacturers and the unmasked names (real
identities) for the retail chains. Future research conducted with additional identity related
information may provide valuable contextual insights on how different manufacturers and
retailers react to the growth in organic products.
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CHAPTER 3
HOW DO CONSUMERS CHOOSE BETWEEN ORGANIC PRODUCTS
AND MULTIPLE PRODUCT ATTRIBUTES? AN EMPIRICAL STUDY
OF YOGURT SALES
ABSTRACT
The rapid growth in organic product variety poses challenges for retailers to manage
their assortment mix. Although organic consumers are willing to pay a higher price for
organic products, more and more evidence shows that organic consumers are also pricesensitive. In addition, when choosing between organic and conventional products,
consumers face a much more complex decision that involves product brand, style, and
other specific product attributes than a binary choice between organic and conventional
product types. However, an in-depth understanding of how consumers make such
complex decisions involving organic and other product attributes is missing. In this study,
we use scanner panel data from retailers across the united states to examine how
customers evaluate organic products when there are a large number of other product
attributes present at the same time. In particular, we estimate own-price and cross-price
elasticities under different nesting options. Our findings suggest that organic condition,
product style, and seller attributes are all highly influential in shaping consumers’
purchasing decisions. Further, the relationship between organic and conventional
products is much more nuanced and context-specific than previously shown. Counter-
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intuitively, we find products that are most appealing to health-conscious consumers are
also the ones that are most prone to price changes. Through this finding, we are able to
provide insights to retailers that offer both organic and conventional products on how to
manage their assortment mix.
Keywords: Organic Products, Choice Modeling

3.1. INTRODUCTION
In the last decade, the U.S. organic market has more than doubled in size (Organic
Trade Association, 2018; see Figure 1.1). Driven by the growing number of healthconscious consumers, conventional grocers have significantly increased their assortment
of organic products in recent years . As a result, retailing organic food changed as
traditional purveyors of organic food faced increased competition from companies new to
the sector, with organic food sold not only in natural-products stores, such as Whole
Foods and food cooperatives, but also in traditional supermarkets such as Safeway, bigbox stores such as Wal-Mart, and club stores such as Costco (Dimitri & Oberholtzer,
2009).
Although organic products are typically priced higher than their conventional
counterparts, sales of organic products and especially organic produce are booming. The
organic premiums, defined as “the price difference between the organic and the
nonorganic price of an item when factors such as the type of store sold, time of year and
geographic location are the same” (ERS, 2016), ranged from 7 percent for fresh spinach
to 60 percent for salad mix. This premium does not necessarily deter sales. For example,
17 percent of people who purchase organic at least sometimes were willing to pay up to
35 percent more for organic vegetables, and 27 percent were willing to pay 20 to 34
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percent more (The Hartman Group. 2016 ). It is believed that organic consumers are
much less price-sensitive (Enneking, 2002; Mondelaers et al., 2008) than non-buyers.
However, recent studies suggest that although the “hardcore” organic consumers may be
less price-sensitive, the majority of organic consumers do care about organic pricing. A
2009 study by the Hartman Group found that there are three key consumer demographics:
While 21% of the total consumers buy organic products exclusively, 65% of the total
consumers buy both organic products and conventional products. The “occasional”
organic consumers bring both opportunities and challenges to conventional supermarkets.
On the one hand, carrying non-organic (we refer it as “conventional” hereafter) products
may reduce the loss of sales when a specific organic product is not available. On the
other hand, retailers should also beware of low-margin conventional products cannibalize
the sales of high-margin organic products. Therefore, it is important to understand how
consumers choose between organic and conventional products and how much does
conventional products cannibalize the sales of organic products. Especially for those
retailers who carry both types of products.
Along with the rapid growth of organic products, new product features have also
emerged and prospered. For example, Greek yogurt, no matter organic or conventional,
who has a total of $60 million market in the United States back in 2005 turns $1.5 Billion
in 2011 . As new products and product features emerge almost every day, grocery stores
today carry 40,000 more items than they did in the 1990s (Malito, 2017). The rapid
growth of product variety has significantly increased operational costs such as inventory
and out-of-stock costs. What makes the matter more urgent is that for most of the grocery
stores, the shelf space does not grow concomitantly with increasing product variety.
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Because growth in total product variety spikes operating costs and increases the
possibility of stock-outs, which ultimately hurts retailers’ profits (Alfaro & Corbett,
2003; Fisher & Ittner, 1999; Shockley et al., 2015; Ton & Raman, 2010). This is
especially a concern for stores that have tighter space constraints, such as stores located
in urban areas and convenience stores. In addition, such capacity constraints have become
more prominent because of shrinking store sizes: on average, newly opened stores are
about 25 percent smaller than existing stores (McKinsey & Company, 2013). Therefore,
it is challenging for retailers to choose the correct organic and conventional product mix
when increasing their organic product offerings. Although how organic assortment, price,
and promotions drive retailer performance has been studied in previous work, an in-depth
understanding of how consumers make complex purchase decisions involving organic
products among numerous other non-organic related attributes is missing. In this study,
we seek to find how consumers would make their purchase decisions when facing such
complex choices and what is the best assortment mix for retailers that carry both organic
products and conventional products.
We examine the following research questions: (1) How consumers evaluate organic
products when there are multiple features and attributes of the organic product, and
directly evaluate the cannibalization effect of conventional products on organic products.
(2) What is the best assortment mix for retailers who sell both organic and conventional
products? Specifically, we examine the relative effect of product attributes (price, brand,
nutrition information, style, etc.) and seller-related attributes (store type, store size,
promotion, advertising, etc.) on consumers’ choices for organic products. We focus our
study on sales of yogurts for several reasons. First of all, both organic yogurts and

69

conventional yogurts experience rapid growth in both sales and the richness of product
features. The strong performance in yogurt industry leads to an explosion of product
variety, therefore retailers must carefully choose the products to carry on the shelf.
Second, unlike most of the packaged consumer goods, yogurts typically have a relatively
short shelf life (about 3 weeks) and have to be stored in the refrigerated area. Therefore,
anything that does not sell at the end of the shelf life would be a waste of both money and
the precious shelf space. Third, yogurts are often on price promotions, and consumers are
likely to purchase the products on sale. The increase of sales in promotional items and the
decrease of sales in non-promotional items make retailers difficult to evaluate the effect
of the promotions. Therefore, retailers need a better understanding of the substitutional
effects on the products they carry.
We use four years (2008-2011) of weekly scanner data obtained from Information
Resources Inc. (IRi) and employ structural estimation techniques developed in the
empirical industrial organization literature to conduct our analysis (Berry 1994). This
analysis method allows us to better understand why a consumer makes a particular choice
and how the consumer analyzes trade-offs among the attributes of the choices.
Our research contributes to the operations management literature as follows.
Although organic products have been perceived as having a better quality, taste, and
healthier in terms of pesticide residue than its conventional counterparts, the direct
competition between organic products and their conventional counterparts has received
little attention. Our study builds on a recent stream of work exploring how price and
marketing actions (Ngobo, 2011; Bezawada & Pauwels, 2013) influence consumers’
attitudes and willingness to pay for organic products. However, most papers in this
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stream assume consumers face a simple binary choice: an organic product or a
conventional product. They also assume consumers have no preference for all other
choices within the same product category. In practice, however, consumers’ preferences
for organic products and conventional products may also be influenced by product brand,
style, and other attributes. Additionally, consumers may choose where to shop such as a
bigger retailer or a small convenience store. Overall, our study includes a much broader
choice set than those represented in previous studies. And we also account for consumers
may have a certain preference for what types or brands of products they would like. By
analyzing the relative effects of the noted product and seller-related variables on
consumers’ choices, we extend the previous literature by conducting a more direct
examination of the cannibalization effect between organic products and conventional
products.

3.2. LITERATURE REVIEW
In this section, we review the literature from two related streams of research: what
are the key factors for consumers to choose from organic or conventional products and
choice modeling techniques in operations management literature.
3.2.1 HOW CONSUMERS CHOOSE BETWEEN ORGANIC AND CONVENTIONAL PRODUCTS
Organic product sales have increased from $3.6 billion in 1997 to $47 billion in
2016 (Organic Trade Association, 2016). Consumers value organic food because it is
seen as being healthier, more nutritious, better tasting, and safer because no chemicals are
used in its production (Bauer et al., 2013). According to anecdotal evidence, consumers
often purchase organic produce according to the “dirty dozen and clean fifteen”
standards, which identify groceries with the most pesticide residue and those with the
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least contamination (Pou, 2010). Currently, consumers in the United States buy more
organic products in traditional supermarkets than in other outlets . Meanwhile, traditional
supermarkets are increasingly promoting organic products through various in-store
marketing programs (e.g., increasing variety, displays). Because organics have higher
gross margins, 30% to 50% versus 20% to 25% for conventional products (Oberholtzer et
al., 2006), promoting organic products would enhance total category profits and store
revenues (Bezawada & Pauwels, 2013).
The growing segment of organic consumers is usually associated with higher
disposable income, higher education, and lower price sensitivity (Krystallis et al., 2006).
More recent studies start to find that this growing segment of consumers does not
exclusively buy organic: a 2009 study by the Hartman Group found that, while 21% of
consumers buy organic only, 65% of consumers buy both conventional and organic
products (Chait, 2017). Evidence shows that organic customers also purchase
conventional products if they find them attractive, particularly when the prices of organic
products are too high or when the supply of organic products is limited (Hudson, 2012).
However, there has not been much study to investigate exactly how much does organic
customers care about product price or promotions, and how do customers choose between
the two broad product categories. Not to mention how do consumers choose among all
the different products and facing much more complex choices than choosing only
between organic and conventional products.
A handful of studies used revealed data (typically scanner panel) to analyze how
organic consumers react to retail prices, and they have mixed findings. Glaser and
Thompson (2000) report large own-price elasticity (between –3.63 and –9.73) for U.S.
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organic milk in the late 1990s. They also find the cross-price elasticity suggests that
organic and branded conventional milk are substitutes. However, the substitution
response is asymmetry where change in organic milk has little effect on conventional
branded milk whereas change in conventional branded milk has a great effect on organic
milk. In contrast, Kiesel and Villas-Boas (2007) report small price elasticity (between –
.001 and –.003) for U.S. organic milk in the 2000s. By study data from Europe, Ngobo
(2011) concludes that organic products may be a poor fit for traditional marketing actions
such as price reduction and a higher variety. However, using United States data,
Bezawada and Pauwels (2013) find that enduring actions, such as assortment and regular
price changes, have a higher elasticity for organics than for conventional products. That
is, in contrast with common wisdom, even “core” organic consumers are sensitive to
these actions.
The extant literature does not, however, provide a clear understanding of how other
product-related (style, brand, nutrition, etc.) and seller-related factors influence
consumers’ preferences when choosing between organic products and conventional
products. In addition, all of the studies mentioned above do not assume consumers may
have a certain preference for how they choose to buy their products. In practice, however,
consumers may first select a style than select whether to buy an organic product within
that style, or they may first decide whether to buy an organic product or a conventional
one than select a style later. Our study accounts for such consumer preferences by using
conditional nested models, therefore, we help fill this gap in the literature by using
revealed purchase data to calculate cross-price elasticities between product organic status
and styles.
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3.2.2. CHOICE MODELING TECHNIQUES IN OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT LITERATURE
Capturing and understanding consumer choice behavior has become more and more
important to business managers (Garrow 2016). As the increase in product options in
retail markets has significantly expanded the number of options that are available to
consumers (Ton & Raman, 2010). Choice models, which allow researchers to understand
how a consumer evaluates the attributes of alternatives within a product category, are one
approach to studying consumer choices. The discrete-choice demand model stemming
from McFadden (1978) and Manski and McFadden’s (1981) random utility framework is
a widely-leveraged approach to understand consumer choices. The discrete-choice
demand model was intended to provide an appropriate framework for the empirical
analysis of choice among finite sets of alternatives, with each alternative characterized as
a bundle of attributes (Manski, 2001). McFadden (1978) supposed that each member of a
population of interest faces a finite choice set and selects an alternative that maximizes
his/her utility. Further, the model assumes that the purchase decisions of consumers are
affected by the selection of products that a seller offers. In the field of operations
management, choice modeling techniques have been used in a wide range of research
contexts. In retail operations, for example, researchers have used these methods to assist
with assortment planning (Rusmevichientong et al., 2010; Kok and Xu 2011; Li and Huh,
2011; Rusmevichientong & Topaloglu, 2012). To perform our analyses, we leverage the
structural estimation technique introduced by Berry (1994) which allows for the
development of models of demand and supply equations. The Berry (1994) and Berry et
al., (1995) models were one of the first methods to estimate demand based on random
utility maximization (RUM) models, using aggregate market-level sales data. In the
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recent Operations literature, the Berry structural estimation model has been employed by
Nevo (2001) to estimate the price margin in the ready-to-eat cereal industry, Allon et al.,
(2011) to estimate the value of reducing customer wait times in the drive-thru fast-food
industry, Guajardo et al., (2016) to examine how various product and service attributes
affect demand for US automobiles and McKie et al., (2018) to examine how consumers’
choices for different generation and conditions of iPads are affected by seller and product
attributes on eBay. Similarly, we leverage the model to understand how consumers’
choices for organic and conventional yogurts are affected by market and product-related
variables.
The Berry model distinctively assumes prices are endogenously determined by
firms., while most of the existing empirical literature on this topic assumes prices are
exogenous. The exogenous assumption has been noted as a significant limitation in the
literature (Berry 1994, Guajardo et al., 2016). Therefore, we follow Guajardo et al.,
(2016) and Mckie et al., (2018), to develop instrumental variables for the price and nested
market share, using the sum of the other observations’ characteristics (see section 3.4.2).
Thus, similar to Guajardo et al., (2016) and McKie et al., (2018), from a methodological
perspective we extend the previous research on this topic through directly controlling for
the endogeneity of prices.

3.3. DATA AND MEASURES
We first describe our data source and sample size in Section 3.3.1, and then we
describe the dependent, independent, and control variables used in our analyses in
Section 3.3.2.
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3.3.1. DATA
We use four years of proprietary scanner data (2008-2011) from IRi, which reports
data for grocery chains and drug stores in 50 markets in the U.S. (except Alaska and
Hawaii). The raw data contains three files that separately report: 1) weekly Stock
Keeping Unit (SKU) sales and unit price, 2) SKU attributes (e.g., product type, organic
status, fat content, promotion, and product size), and 3) store information (location, chain
affiliates, market, and store’s annual sales). An SKU is defined as a unique combination
of brand, flavor, weight, container material, container size, and pack size. We first use the
Universal Product Code (UPC) number to identify each SKU and then combine the SKU
sales data with the SKU attributes data. We then use the store ID from both the SKU
sales data and store information data to arrive at our final sample. We use data pertaining
to the yogurt category to test our hypotheses for two main reasons. First of all, both
organic yogurts and conventional yogurts experience rapid growth in both sales and the
richness of product features. The strong performance in yogurt industry leads to an
explosion of product variety, therefore retailers need to carefully choose the products to
carry on shelf. For example, in our sample, the total number of varieties of yogurt in the
US market soared 32% from 4,581 in 2008 to 6,053 in 2011. In comparison, the organic
SKU category increased 30%, from 256 SKUs (in 2008) to 331 SKUs (in 2011).
Moreover, we also see large number of SKUs in almost every yogurt type and style. The
richness in yogurt variety enables us to better understand consumers’ specific preferences
in certain product attributes. Second, unlike most of the packaged consumer goods,
yogurts typically have a relatively short shelf life (about 3 weeks) and have to be stored
in the refrigerated area. Therefore, anything that does not sell at the end of the shelf life
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would be a waste of both money and the precious shelf space. Third, yogurts are often on
price promotions, and consumers are likely to purchase the ones on sale. The increase of
sales in promotional items and the decrease of sales in non-promotional items make
retailers difficult to evaluate the effect of the promotions. Therefore, retailers need better
understanding of the substitutional effects on different products they carry. The yogurt
category in the raw data has 7,112 SKUs in total, including discontinued SKUs and
yogurt by-products, such as almond yogurt, buffalo milk yogurt, yogurt smoothies, and
kefir. We dropped all yogurt by-products in our study to focus on the main yogurt
category products. Our final sample is an unbalanced panel dataset that contains 208
weeks of data for 1,896 stores in 50 markets. Two kinds of stores are included in our
dataset: grocery stores and drug/convenience stores. There are 1,561 grocery stores and
335 drug/convenience stores in our final sample. Our dataset does not contain wholesale
clubs such as Costco and Sam’s Club. Across all the stores, there are 6,053 yogurt SKUs,
including 242 brands produced by 88 manufacturers (including private-labels). To
address our research questions, we aggregated the raw data at the weekly store level, that
is, we calculated the total sales of each SKU in a store i at week t. We also calculated
other store-specific characteristics based on sales data, as described below.
3.3.2. PRODUCT AND TRANSACTION-RELATED VARIABLES
We extracted all product and transaction-related information from the final data
sample. We use the UPC code as the identification of each SKU, and extract all productrelated information from the sales data at store-week level.
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3.3.2.1. PRICE
Price is one of the most important factors when consumers make purchase decisions.
In our research settings, different yogurts have different prices and are in different
package sizes. To standardize the price on each product, we follow Nevo (2001) to
convert all product prices to Dollars per Pint.
3.3.2.2. ORGANIC
For each SKU, there is a binary variable indicates whether the product is organic.
We thus model Organic as a binary variable that equals 1 if the SKU is an organic
product, and 0 if the SKU is a conventional product.
3.3.2.3. STYLE
Amongst our SKU level weekly sales of 52,329,765 observations, We observe 31
different styles in our dataset, including the most commonly observed yogurt styles such
as Grade-A (32,300,000 observations), Greek (4,155,480 observations), Creamy
(2,691,613 observations), All-Natural (2,336,685 observations), and some less commonly
seen styles such as Bulgarian (2,493 observations), Kosher (335 observations). We also
have some observations that marked style as Missing (408,631 observations). Note that
the Grade-A yogurt style in our dataset stands for yogurts that do not specifically have a
style (e.g. Yoplait Original, Dannon Activia, Stonyfield Farm, etc.), because according to
USDA regulations, all yogurts made and sold in the united states must be made from
Grade-A milk. As a result, we renamed the Grade-A yogurt style as “Regular”. And
because there are no other styles of yogurt (except Greek, All-Natural, Creamy, and
Regular) have more than 1,000,000 observations in our data, we combined all other styles
including Missing and rename them as “Other” style. We thus model Style as a
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categorical variable that equals 1 if the product style is Greek, 2 if the product style is
All-Natural, 3 if the product style is Creamy, 4 if the product style is Regular, and 5 if the
product style is Other.
3.3.2.4. PRIVATE-LABEL
For each SKU, we also find if the product if a private-label product. We leverage
this information because consumers may have a different preference for private-label
products, and private-label products directly compete with national brand products
(Ailawadi & Keller, 2004). We model Private-label as a binary variable that equals 1 if
the product is a private-label product, and 0 if the product is a national brand.
3.3.2.5. BRAND
There are 232 different brands in our dataset. As a product brand is apparently a key
factor in consumers’ choices (Macdonald & Sharp, 2000), we model brand as a
categorical variable that represents each different brand names.
3.3.2.6. FAT-CONTENT
We also acquire the fat-content information for each product in our dataset because
fat-content is another key factor that affects consumer choices in the dairy product
category. There are 21 different levels of fat-content in our data. And this high variability
is due to different brand describe their fat-content in different ways. For example, some
brands describe their product as “1% Low Fat” whereas some other brands describe their
product as “99% Fat-Free”. We leverage the fat-content information and create a
categorical variable FatContent, that equals 1 to 21 to identify the fat-content on each
product.
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3.3.3. SELLER RELATED VARIABLES
There are 1896 unique sellers (stores) in our dataset. We extract several store
attributes that may affect consumer choices when they shop at the stores.
TotalVatirety measures the total number of yogurt SKUs that were sold in the store i
at week t. As indicated in the operations literature, higher variety often leads to higher
sales because consumers are more likely to find the product they needed (Bayus & Putsis,
1999; Xia & Rajagopalan, 2009; Ton & Raman, 2010).
PackageSize measures the average size of the yogurt products in the store i at week
t. Larger stores typically have higher average product sizes, and they carry more product
variety at a lower price than smaller stores (e.g., big-box retailers compared to small
convenience stores), therefore consumers are more likely to find the product they needed
and make purchases.
Advertisement measures the percentage of yogurt in the store that is on store
advertisement. Although advertisement may be an effective way to increase consumer
purchases on the advertised products, it may also reduce consumer purchases on products
that are not on advertisement.
Discount measures the percentage of yogurt in the store i that is on sale at week t.
Similar to Advertisement, a high percentage of discounted items may increase sales on the
discounted items, but reduce the purchase of products that are not on sale.
In addition, the 1896 stores belong to 103 retail chains that reside in 50 metropolitan
markets in the United States. Although the retail chain names are masked, we can still
identify and tie each store to its retail chain in a certain market area.
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3.3.4. AGGREGATION TECHNIQUE AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
To prepare the data for analysis, we first segment the transactions by week and
market. Specifically, we define 10400 (208 weeks * 50 markets) markets by geographic
conditions and week indicators as in the dataset. Because both time and geographic
conditions limit the options that a consumer faces when purchasing from a brick and
mortar store. In addition, segmenting markets by time also captures factors like
seasonality. The total sales figures were calculated from the dataset by adding up all
yogurt sales in each market. We aggregated the data in each market by seller i. Thus, for
each week and market, we calculated the average values for each seller (i) that sells brand
(j), style (k), organic (l) private-label (m), and fat content (n).
Descriptive statistics for yogurt types and styles are presented in table 3.1 to table
3.3. We also present descriptive statistics for relevant categorical and continuous
variables, and related correlation tables in table 3.4 to 3.6, respectively.

Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics for Yogurt Organic Condition
Type
Conventional
Organic

Observations
47,673,234
4,656,531

Mean Price
1.5394643
2.3719485

SD
1.309206
1.411112

Table 3.2 Descriptive Statistics for Yogurt Styles
Style
Greek
All-Natural
Regular
Creamy
Other

Observations
4,155,480
2,336,685
37,369,292
4,620,210
3,848,098
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Mean Price
2.0869939
1.5532751
1.5760708
1.6390927
1.4720824

SD
1.394539
1.055484
1.351474
1.351839
1.192319

Table 3.3 Descriptive Statistics for Yogurt Style-Organic
Style-Organic
Greek C
Greek O
All-Natural C
All-Natural O
Regular C
Regular O
Creamy C
Creamy O
Other C
Other O

Observations
3,669,098
486,382
2,102,488
234,197
35,791,981
1,577,311
3,061,037
1,559,173
3,048,630
799,468

Mean Price
2.025438
2.5513501
1.6220092
0.93621957
1.5470951
2.2335811
1.1779839
2.5443619
1.1710205
2.6201287

SD
1.396479
1.288286
1.089219
0.203318
1.343409
1.366869
1.011411
1.47309
0.93052
1.370132

Table 3.4 Descriptive Statistics for Categorical Variables
Variable
Organic

Catagories
Count
0: Conventional
47,673,234
1: Organic
4,656,531
PrivateLabel
0: National Brand
43,868,510
1: Private-label
8,461,255
Style
1: Greek
4,155,480
2: All-Natural
2,336,685
3: Regular
37369292
4: Creamy
4,620,210
5: Other
3,848,098
Notes. Brand and Fat Content are omitted for abbreviation.

Percentage
91.10%
8.90%
83.83%
16.17%
7.94%
4.47%
71.41%
8.83%
7.35%

Table 3.5 Descriptive Statistics for Continuous Variables
Variable
Price
PackageSize
Advertisement
TotalVariety
Discount
StoreRevenue

Obs
52,329,765
52,329,765
52,329,765
52,329,765
52,329,765
52,329,765

Mean
2.082268
0.7997985
0.1346979
213.6298
0.2641606
29.69415
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Std. Dev.
0.8962213
0.0864905
0.1074949
63.39978
0.1493009
17.27097

Min
0.005
0.25
0
1
0
0.11

Max
159.98
2
1
503
1
146.241

Table 3.6 Correlation Table
Package
Price
Size
Advertisement
Price
1
PackageSize
-0.1005*
1
Advertisement
-0.0198* -0.0299*
1
TotalVariety
0.1272* -0.1312*
-0.0065*
Discount
-0.0478* 0.0786*
0.4566*
StoreRevenue
-0.0039* 0.0877*
-0.0700*
Organic
0.2333* -0.0316*
-0.0043*
PrivateLabel
-0.3675* 0.1119*
0.0154*
Style
-0.3421* -0.0054*
0.0061*
Notes. * denotes significance at p < .05 level.

Total
Variety

Discount

1
-0.0296*
0.5183*
0.1094*
-0.0904*
-0.0567*
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1
-0.1390*
-0.0267*
0.0197*
0.0005*

StoreRevenue

1
0.0949*
-0.0100*
0.0043*

Organic

1
-0.0466*
0.1403*

PrivateLabel

1
0.0517*

Style

1

3.4. ANALYSIS AND INITIAL RESULTS
3.4.1. ANALYSIS
Choice modeling is the most natural approach for determining how consumers
choose between different product attributes (i.e., organic or conventional) of the same
product (Garrow, 2016). However, in our research setting, a direct application of choice
models (such as multinomial or nested logit) is difficult as we do not know what other
options each consumer was exposed to when they made their purchase decision. We
leverage the Berry (1994) method for demand estimation in differentiated markets, where
we could use aggregate sales data to estimate the impact of price and other product and
seller characteristics on product demand. To develop the model, we first define the utility
of an individual i purchasing product j as
𝑈𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼𝑝𝑗 + 𝛽𝑥𝑗′ + 𝜉𝑗 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗

(3.1)

where pj is the average price of product j, xj' is a vector of product and seller
characteristics (i.e., total variety, store revenue, discount level) observed by both
researchers and consumers, ξj is a vector of characteristics (i.e., product, environmental,
demographic, etc.) unobserved by the researchers but observed by consumers, and ϵij is
an error term representing consumer i’s idiosyncratic preferences for product j. We
express the aggregate utility for product j as
𝛿𝑗 = 𝛼𝑝𝑗 + 𝛽𝑥𝑗′ + 𝜉𝑗

(3.2)

Using Berry’s (1994) inversion method, we derive the following non-nested model
𝑙𝑛(𝑠𝑗 ) − 𝑙𝑛(𝑠0 ) = 𝛿𝑗 = 𝛼𝑝𝑗 + 𝛽𝑥𝑗′ + 𝜉𝑗

(3.3)

where sj is the market share of product j and s0 is the market share of the outside option.
The outside option in the Berry (1994) formulation represents the market share of
any alternative product that a customer is presented and considered when choosing
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whether or not to purchase an available product from the retailer. There are several
choices that we could choose for the outside option parameter. A more conservative
choice is to assume that consumers only consider yogurts offered through the current
store they are shopping at. In this case, the total sales of yogurt sold in the same store are
used as the reference. However, this option omits the activity of shop-hopping, which is
widely observed in consumer behavior (Steiner, 1984). Therefore, we leverage a less
conservative choice, that is to assume that customers consider purchasing yogurts from
all stores within a market, including the stores that are not included in our dataset. In this
case, the total sales of all yogurts in the same market would be used. Specifically, we
compute s0 as the ratio of total sales of other yogurts on the market that is not observed in
our dataset (i.e., the outside option) against the total sales of yogurt on the same market
(including the sales observed in our dataset) during the same time period as our study.
The above described non-nested model violates the property of the independence of
irrelevant alternatives. Specifically, consumers usually have preferences for product
brand, style, etc. In other words, a consumer who purchases a Stonyfield yogurt may be
more likely to select another Stonyfield yogurt than a Yoplait when their first choice is
not available. A priori, we do not know what the best nesting structure is. It may be that
customers are more likely to purchase within the same brand, or they may be more likely
to purchase within the same organic condition. Thus, we build several models where we
next our data by Brand, Organic, Style, etc. We finally choose to nest our data by Brand
and Organic, as suggested in previous literature, consumers recognize both brand and
organic label as the most important factors of their purchase intention (Konuk, 2018;
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Bauer et. al., 2013). Therefore, we assume consumers are more likely to purchase within
the same brand and organic condition when their first choice is not available.
We created 233 nests (g=0, 1, 2, …, 232) based on Brand-Organic pairs, where each
number indicates a different combination of brand and organic attributes, and g=0
represents the outside option only. Using the Berry inversion method, we derive the
nested logit model as
𝑙𝑛(𝑠𝑗 ) − 𝑙𝑛(𝑠0 ) = 𝛼𝑝𝑗 + 𝛽𝑥𝑗′ + 𝜎 𝑙𝑛(𝑠𝑗|𝑔 ) + 𝜉𝑗

(3.4)

where σ is the factor measuring substitutability (0 < σ < 1) and sj|g is the market share of
product j in nest g.
3.4.2. CONDITION NESTED MODEL
Table 3.7 presents the 2-stage lease square (2SLS) estimates of our condition nested
model. As can be seen in the table, we find that price has a negative (β=-0.73) and highly
significant (p < .001) effect on consumers’ choices. Further, the estimate of the
coefficient r of nested market share is 0.66, which falls in the acceptable range between 0
and 1, indicating that it captures substitutability (Berry 1994). Finally, the coefficients of
PrivateLabel is positive and significant, that is, all else equal (including price), demand is
higher for a private-label product.
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Table 3.7: Condition Nested Model, IV Estimates
DV(𝒍𝒏(𝒔𝒋 ) − 𝒍𝒏(𝒔𝟎 ))

Coef.

Std. Err.

Price
-0.73354*** 0.008777
Ln(Sj|g)
0.665793*** 0.000441
PackageSize
0.603629*** 0.005102
Advertisement
-0.23797*** 0.002423
PrivateLabel
0.758617*** 0.006222
StoreRevenue
0.004215*** 0.000039
Discount
0.939448*** 0.002602
TotalVariety
0.001263*** 7.67E-06
Notes: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.

z

P>z [95% Conf. Interval]

-83.57
1506.97
118.3
-98.2
121.91
106.13
361.02
164.6

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

-0.7507502
0.664927
0.5936282
-0.2427265
0.7464212
0.0041381
0.9343486
0.001248

-0.716343
0.6666589
0.6136305
-0.233226
0.7708139
0.0042938
0.9445489
0.0012781

We use 2SLS estimates because it is likely that the product’s price and nested
market share are correlated with unobserved characteristics. For example, if there are
unobserved factors (to the researcher) that may cause the demand for a particular brand or
style to be higher in a certain period, then a seller may set a higher price (by not putting
up a discount or promotion) for these products during that period. To correct for this
possible endogeneity, we used instrumental variables (IVs) for price and nested market
share. Specifically, the sum of the other products’ characteristics (i.e., package size,
advertisement level, and fat content) within a nest in a market was used as instruments for
each observation’s price and nested market share. The sum of the other observations’
characteristics are appropriate instruments since they are excluded from the utility
equation (Uij or δj does not depend on product/seller characteristics of other observations)
and they are correlated with prices via the markups in the first-order conditions (Berry,
1994; Berry et al., 1995). A similar set of instruments have been used in past operations
management studies that have used aggregate choice models (e.g., Guajardo et al., 2016;
McKie et al., 2018). We then tested endogeneity using both Durbin-Wu-Hausman Chi-
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squared and Wu-Hausman F scores. The Durbin Chi-squared statistic of 66024.6 (p <
.001) and Wu-Hausman F score 33063.8 (p < .001). In the first stage of 2SLS, we
evaluated the explanatory power of our IVs by using the tests for excluded instruments
for both price and nested market share. The null hypothesis that the excluded instruments
have no explanatory power was rejected (Staiger & Stock 1997). Specifically, the Fstatistics (p-value) for price and nested market share were 73524 (p < .001) and 780000
(p < .001), respectively. Second, we ran the test of underidentification of instruments.
The null hypothesis that our instruments are underidentified was also rejected.
Specifically, the Anderson Canonical Correlation LM Statistic is 82000 (p < .001). In
sum, these tests provide validity to our model specification and the use of instruments to
address the endogeneity of price and the nested market share variables (Guajardo et al.,
2016; McKie et al., 2018).

3.5. DISCUSSION OF MAIN RESULTS
Using the estimates in table 3.1 and Equation 5, we compute the product’s own and
cross-price elasticities using yogurt styles and/or organic as nests due to our research
interests. For example, in table 3, for the own-price elasticities, we estimate whether the
own-price elasticities of product style k (k = 2, 3, 4, 5) are different than the own-price
elasticity of product style 1 (Greek yogurt) at the 95% significance level. Following
McKie et al., (2018), we use the upper and lower confidence interval estimates of α and σ
to estimate our significance level by checking to see if the elasticity estimates (calculated
using either the upper or lower values from the 95% confidence intervals) have any
overlaps. We estimate whether the cross-price elasticities of product pair (i, j) [i≠j,
(i,j)≠(2,1)] are different from the cross-price elasticity of product type pair (2, 1) at the
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95% significance level using the upper and lower confidence interval estimates of α and
σ. As a result, the own-price elasticity shows the resulting percent decrease in market
share when the price of a yogurt type increases by 1%. And the cross-price elasticity
shows the resulting percent increase in market share when the price of another yogurt
type increases by 1%.
𝜕𝑠𝑖 𝑝𝑗
𝜕𝑝𝑗𝑠𝑖

𝛼𝑝𝑖 [

1

1−𝜎

=

−𝛼𝑝𝑗 [(

−(
𝜎

1−𝜎

{−𝛼𝑝𝑗 𝑠𝑗 ,

σ
1−σ

) si|k ] − 𝛼𝑝𝑖 𝑠𝑖 ,

𝑖𝑓 𝑖 = 𝑗

)𝑠𝑗|𝑘 + 𝑠𝑗 ] , 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗, 𝑖 ∈ 𝑘, 𝑗 ∉ 𝑘

(3.5)

𝑖𝑓 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗, 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑘

3.5.1. OWN AND CROSS-PRICE ELASTICITY CALCULATIONS BY ORGANIC
We first report the own and cross-price elasticity by the organic condition in table
3.8. The diagonal represents the average own-price elasticities for organic and
conventional yogurts. The own-price elasticity values show the resulting percent decrease
in market share when the price of a yogurt increases by 1%. For example, 1% increase in
conventional yogurt prices in a store would result in on average 4.39% decrease in
market share for that store. Similarly, 1% increase in organic yogurt price in a store
would result in on average 5.95% decrease in market share for that store. The offdiagonal represents the average cross-price elasticity values for organic and conventional
yogurts. The cross-price elasticity values show how price changes in the conditions listed
in the columns affect market share for the conditions listed in the table rows. For
example, 1% increase in conventional yogurt prices in a store would on average increase
the market share of organic yogurt for that seller by 0.026%. Similarly, 1% increase in
organic yogurt price in a store would on average increase the market share of
conventional yogurt for that seller by 0.089%.
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Table 3.8: Own and Cross-price Elasticity by Organic
Conventional
Organic
Conventional
-4.39664
0.08900
Organic
0.02647†
-5.95207*
Notes: *Denotes own-price elasticity of product type j (j = 2) is different from own-price
elasticity of product type 1 at 95% significance level.
†
Denotes cross-price elasticity of product type pair (i, j) [i ≠ j, (i, j) ≠ (2,1)] is
different from cross-price elasticity of product type pair (2, 1) at 95% significance level.
We find that the own-price elasticity for organic yogurt is significantly greater than
that of conventional yogurt (-5.95 versus -4.39). This finding is consistent with previous
literature -- Bezawada and Pauwels (2013), that suggests even core organic consumers
are price sensitive. A possible explanation for this result is that consumers are more
price-sensitive to products that are more standardized in nature (McKie et al., 2018).
Where organic products have much more standardized requirements in their production
process, conventional products do not have strict requirements regarding the raw
materials, manufacturing processes and transportation processes. The results also suggest
that although consumers are generally willing to pay higher prices for organic products,
the high price sensitivity may off-set the benefit of higher pricing if retailers are not
aware of such market effects.
The cross-price elasticity suggests that although conventional and organic products
are substitutes, the substitution effect is asymmetry. Our results allow us to evaluate the
cannibalization effect of conventional products to organic products. We find that change
in organic price has a greater effect on conventional yogurt (0.089) whereas change in
conventional price has a smaller effect on organic yogurt (0.026). Contrast to Glaser and
Thompson (2000), who finds that changes in conventional milk prices have a greater
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effect on organic milk. The different findings may stream from model specification,
where Glaser and Thompson (2000) used only half-gallon packaged milk data and
ignored the possible substitution between different package sizes. In reality, it is possible
that consumers would buy a larger package size to retain low average price (e.g. price per
gallon) when they see a price increase in half-gallon milk. It is also possible that
consumers would switch to a lower package sized milk to retain total costs. Failing to
capture such phenomenon may lead to bias in estimating cross-price elasticity. Another
possible explanation for this phenomenon is that the overall product variety for organic
yogurt is much smaller than the product variety for conventional yogurt. Therefore, it is
more difficult for consumers to find a substitution product with similar taste, style, fatcontent in organic form when consumers’ first choice is a conventional product. On the
contrary, it is easier for consumers to find a close substitute in the conventional form
when consumers’ first choice is an organic product.
3.5.2 OWN AND CROSS-PRICE ELASTICITY CALCULATIONS BY STYLE
Table 3.9 shows the own and cross-price elasticity by yogurt styles. From the ownprice elasticity results, we find that Greek yogurt is the most sensitive to price change.
With 1% price increase in Greek yogurt, the market share of Greek yogurt would
decrease on average 8.62%, followed by Other (5.07%), Creamy (4.29%), All-Natural
(4.17%), and Regular (4.07%). Further, there are significant differences in own-price
elasticity among different yogurt styles. For example, as we could see above, the ownprice elasticities for All-Natural yogurt, Regular yogurt, and Creamy yogurt are much
lower than Greek yogurt.
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Table 3.9: Own and Cross-price Elasticity by Style
Style
Greek All-Natural
Regular
Creamy
Other
†
†
Greek
-8.62977
0.03127
0.02673
0.03896
0.04766†
*
†
†
All-Natural
0.03855
-4.17157
0.02239
0.02045
0.03141†
Regular
0.05328†
0.03401†
-4.07611*
0.03527†
0.04834†
Creamy
0.04718†
0.02087†
0.02356†
-4.29577*
0.03744
†
†
†
Other
0.04775
0.02255
0.02468
0.02775†
-5.07809*
Notes: *Denotes own-price elasticity of product type j (j = 2, 3, 4, 5) is different from
own-price elasticity of product type 1 at 95% significance level.
†
Denotes cross-price elasticity of product type pair (i, j) [i ≠ j, (i, j) ≠ (2,1)] is
different from cross-price elasticity of product type pair (2, 1) at 95% significance level.

One possible explanation for this result is that own-price elasticity could be
decreasing by the average price for each product style. Because in our model
specification, own-price elasticity is a function of the product’s price. However, although
Greek yogurt does have the highest average price and highest own-price elasticity, the
other four product styles do not fall into the rule of “the higher price, the higher ownprice elasticity”. For example, the average price for Greek yogurt is 2.08 dollars per pint,
followed by Creamy (1.63), Regular (1.57), All-Natural (1.55), and Other (1.47). Thus, it
is feasible that our results do indicate differences in consumers’ sensitivity to product
style, as the own-price elasticity is not just a reflection of price.
Another possible explanation for the own-price elasticity difference is that
consumers may find it easier to find a close substitute in styles that have more product
variety than those that have less product variety. In our dataset, we have 333 SKUs in
Greek yogurt, where we have 148 SKUs in All-Natural yogurt, 2469 SKUs in Regular
yogurt, 193 SKUs in Creamy yogurt, and 715 SKUs in Other yogurt. Therefore, although
Greek yogurt has a lower number of SKU than Regular and Other yogurt, it actually has
more SKUs than All-Natural yogurt and Creamy yogurt. Therefore, we believe that the
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own-price elasticity is not driven by the availability of substitutes in the same category.
Rather, our results do indicate that consumers are more sensitive to price changes in
certain styles. In addition, this additional own-price elasticity in Greek yogurt indicates
that although it is believed that people are willing to pay a bit more for Greek yogurt
because it is healthier, the high price sensitivity may off-set the benefit of higher selling
price if the retailer is not aware of such market effect.
From the cross-price elasticity values, we find that different styles of yogurts are
substitutes, as all cross-price elasticity estimations are positive. Next, we find gains in
market share of the other four styles are higher when the price of Greek yogurt increase
as compared to similar increases in the price of the other four styles. This result may
suggest that regular consumers for Greek yogurt have a higher disposable income
(Boynton & Novakovic, 2014; Mohammed et al., 2018). This substitution effect is also
asymmetric, as when Greek yogurt increase 1% in price, the market share of All-Natural
yogurt, Regular yogurt and Creamy yogurt would increase market share by on average
0.038%, 0.053% and 0.047% respectively. Whereas when All-Natural yogurt, Regular
yogurt and Creamy yogurt increases 1% in price, the market share of Greek yogurt would
only increase 0.031%, 0.026% and 0.038% respectively.
We find Regular yogurt seems to be the most possible substitute for all other yogurt
styles except for Creamy yogurt. When Greek yogurt, All-Natural yogurt, and Other
yogurt increases 1% in price, the Regular yogurt has the most growth in market share
(0.053%, 0.034% and 0.048% respectively). However, for Creamy yogurt, the Greek
yogurt is the closest substitute, as 1% increase in Creamy yogurt price would increase
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Greek yogurt market share by 0.038%. This is likely resulting from the similar texture
and taste between the two styles.
3.5.3 OWN AND CROSS-PRICE ELASTICITY CALCULATIONS BY STYLE AND ORGANIC
Table 3.10 shows the own and cross-price elasticity by both yogurt styles and
organic conditions. The results allow us to further understand (1) How consumers
evaluate organic products when there are multiple other features and (2) What is the best
assortment mix for retailers who sell both organic and conventional products.
From the own-price elasticity, we find that similar to own-price elasticity calculation
in 3.5.1, organic products have a higher own-price elasticity in every yogurt style. Our
findings further suggest that consumers do care about organic pricing. And retailers need
to be aware of such market effect and avoid pricing organic products too high. Next, we
find that Organic Greek yogurt has the highest own-price elasticity. 1% increase in
Organic Greek yogurt price would result in 11.9% decrease in its market share. Although
Organic Greek yogurt is one of the most expensive types of yogurt in our dataset (2.55
dollars per pint), which may play a role in its high own-price elasticity, other types of
yogurt do not show a strong correlation between the average price and own-price
elasticity. In fact, the Conventional Greek yogurt has an average price of 2.02 dollars per
pint, which is cheaper than Organic Regular (2.23 dollars per pint), Organic Creamy
(2.54 dollars per pint) and Organic Other yogurt (2.62 dollars per pint). Yet, the
Conventional Greek yogurt has higher own-price elasticity than any organic yogurt listed
above. Another explanation for the high own-price elasticity in Organic Greek yogurt is
the lack of variety in this product category. Indeed, there are only 25 SKUs in this
product category, offered by only 2 brands (Stonyfield Oikos and Voskos). However, the
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own-price elasticity is not just a reflection of product variability as Conventional Greek
yogurt has 308 SKUs and is offered by 27 brands, while the Organic Regular yogurt has
only 181 SKUs that are offered by similarly 31 brands. Thus, we believe that consumers
do have different price sensitivity in Greek yogurt, as the own-price elasticity is not just a
reflection of price or product variety. This finding in Greek yogurt further suggests
retailers should beware of their Greek yogurt pricing, as consumers are the most pricesensitive in this product category.
From the cross-price elasticity, we are able to directly examine the effect of
cannibalization from conventional products to different types of organic products. For
Organic Greek yogurt, we find that when the price of Organic Greek yogurt increases by
1%, the yogurt types that gain the most market share are Conventional Creamy,
Conventional All-Natural, and Organic All-Natural. A possible explanation for this result
is that consumers for Greek yogurt are attracted by the texture of Creamy yogurt and the
healthy massage carried by All-Natural yogurt. However, as these consumers are pricesensitive, they are less likely to purchase Organic Creamy yogurts which have very
similar price to Greek yogurt. Further, the substitution among these groups is
asymmetric. Where increase in Organic Greek yogurt price by 1% would result in more
than 0.2% market share increase in Conventional Creamy, Conventional All-Natural and
Organic All-Natural yogurt, 1% increase in Conventional Creamy, Conventional AllNatural and Organic All-Natural yogurt would only increase Organic Greek yogurt
market share by 0.08%, 0.06% and 0.01% respectively.
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Table 3.10: Own and Cross-price Elasticity by Style and Organic
Greek C

Greek O All-Natural All-Natural Regular C Regular O Creamy C Creamy O Other C Other O
C
O
Greek C
-8.1942
0.1544† 0.06096† 0.00993† 0.02212† 0.15568† 0.0718† 0.04988
0.0705† 0.07861†
Greek O
0.0501 -11.915* 0.06232† 0.01090† 0.02307† 0.15993† 0.0840†
0.0447†
0.0817† 0.07773†
All-Natural C
0.0669†
0.2241† -4.0267* 0.01080† 0.02123† 0.15192† 0.0669†
0.0367†
0.0804† 0.07422†
†
†
†
†
†
†
All-Natural O
0.0707
0.2180
0.05109 -5.4715* 0.02163 0.14298
0.0720
0.0158
0.0848† 0.06040†
Regular C
0.0478†
0.1788† 0.04151† 0.00732† -4.0161* 0.14193† 0.0384†
0.0403† 0.04980 0.06655†
†
†
†
†
†
†
Regular O
0.0455
0.1650
0.04411 0.00647 0.01935 -5.4376* 0.0449
0.0334†
0.0551† 0.06151†
Creamy C
0.0664†
0.2313† 0.04916† 0.01064† 0.02037† 0.14666† -4.013*
0.0364†
0.0693†
0.0736†
Creamy O
0.0474†
0.1552† 0.03862† 0.00053† 0.02065† 0.13044† 0.0448†
-4.849*
0.0541† 0.05125
†
†
†
†
†
†
†
†
Other C
0.0572
0.1976
0.05133 0.01030 0.02169 0.15379
0.0596
0.0401
-4.933*
0.0751†
Other O
0.0567†
0.1972† 0.04151† 0.00460† 0.01991† 0.13372† 0.0477†
0.0258†
0.0591†
-5.630*
Notes: *Denotes own-price elasticity of product type j (j = 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 ,7 ,8 ,9 ,10) is different from own-price elasticity of product
type 1 at 95% significance level.
†
Denotes cross-price elasticity of product type pair (i, j) [i ≠ j, (i, j) ≠ (2,1)] is different from cross-price elasticity of product
type pair (2, 1) at 95% significance level.

96

With regard to Organic All-Natural yogurt, this product category has the lowest
cross-price elasticity among all product types. 1% increase in Organic All-Natural yogurt
price would result in 0.01% or lower market share increase in all other product
categories. This result may be driven by the fact that all Organic All-Natural yogurt are
supplied by Stonyfield Farm brand, and has an exceptionally low average price per pint
(0.93 dollars). In fact, the average price for Organic All-Natural yogurt is the lowest
among all 10 product categories. However, the Organic All-Natural yogurt is rarely the
first choice when people substitute from other product categories (only exception is when
Conventional Other yogurt price increases). Our finding suggests that the abnormally low
price in organic products may raise concerns from consumers which would ultimately
hurt the sales.
As for Organic Regular yogurt, it has relatively high cross-price elasticity in all
product categories. That is, 1% price increase in Organic Regular yogurt would increase
the market share of all other product categories by around 0.15%. Our findings suggest
that competition between Conventional Regular yogurt and Organic Regular yogurt does
exist. However, Organic Regular yogurt is much more vulnerable in this competition, as
1% price increase in Organic Regular yogurt would increase Conventional Regular
yogurt market share by 0.14%, while 1% price increase in Conventional Regular yogurt
would merely increase Organic Regular yogurt market share by 0.01%.

3.6. ROBUSTNESS CHECK
One possible problem in our research is that we used 4 years of weekly data from
the year 2008 to 2011. Whereat the beginning of this time period, Greek yogurt was very
new to the market, therefore, creates a potential bias in the own and cross-price elasticity.
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Therefore, we re-estimate our models using only the last 8 weeks of our data, where at
the end of year 2011, Greek yogurt has become very mature on the market. We present
our results in table 3.11 to table 3.13, where own and cross-price elasticity are calculated
by organic, style, and organic-style accordingly.
Our results show that all previous findings are consistent. Moreover, the own-price
elasticity for Organic yogurt and Greek yogurt is higher than the full sample estimation.
Our results further validate that organic consumers indeed are price sensitive.

Table 3.11: Robustness Check: Last 8 Weeks Own and Cross-price Elasticity by Organic
Conventional
Organic
Conventional
-6.63356
0.10677†
Organic
0.03026
-8.35953*
Notes: *Denotes own-price elasticity of product type j (j = 2) is different from own-price
elasticity of product type 1 at 95% significance level.
†
Denotes cross-price elasticity of product type pair (i, j) [i ≠ j, (i, j) ≠ (2,1)] is
different from cross-price elasticity of product type pair (2, 1) at 95% significance level.

Table 3.12: Robustness Check: Last 8 Weeks Own and Cross-price Elasticity by Style
Style
Greek All-Natural
Regular
Creamy
Other
Greek
-10.33744
0.05260†
0.02775†
0.05160†
0.05852†
All-Natural
0.04616
-5.611529*
0.02868†
0.04987†
0.05983†
†
†
*
†
Regular
0.04807
0.05505
-5.64319
0.05443
0.06053†
Creamy
0.04702
0.05038†
0.02904†
-5.95301*
0.05747†
Other
0.04914†
0.05321†
0.02953†
0.05251†
-7.68047*
Notes: *Denotes own-price elasticity of product type j (j = 2, 3, 4, 5) is different from
own-price elasticity of product type 1 at 95% significance level.
†
Denotes cross-price elasticity of product type pair (i, j) [i ≠ j, (i, j) ≠ (2,1)] is
different from cross-price elasticity of product type pair (2, 1) at 95% significance level.
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Table 3.13: Robustness Check: Last 8 Weeks Own and Cross-price Elasticity by Style and Organic
Greek C

Greek O

All-Natural All-Natural Regular C Regular O Creamy C Creamy O Other C Other O
C
O
Greek C
-9.9969
0.1536†
0.06452† 0.01079† 0.02246† 0.15843† 0.0766† 0.05264† 0.07213† 0.08347†
Greek O
0.0499
-15.968* 0.06808† 0.01227† 0.02390† 0.16585† 0.0940† 0.04914 0.08530† 0.08697†
†
All-Natural C
0.0628
0.2019†
-5.4749* 0.01532† 0.02784† 0.19481† 0.1159† 0.06240† 0.11706† 0.11528†
All-Natural O
0.0689†
0.2028†
0.07560† -7.4244* 0.03054† 0.18668† 0.1229† 0.03352† 0.12427† 0.11123†
†
†
Regular C
0.0435
0.1496
0.06193† 0.00875† -5.5694* 0.16382† 0.0633† 0.05609† 0.06316† 0.08324†
Regular O
0.0416†
0.14211† 0.06282† 0.00780† 0.02227† -7.2848* 0.0752† 0.04223† 0.07027† 0.07586†
Creamy C
0.0598†
0.1984†
0.07415† 0.01483† 0.02730† 0.19140† -5.518* 0.06002† 0.10976† 0.11155†
†
†
Creamy O
0.0439
0.1322
0.06173† 0.00083† 0.02316† 0.14326† 0.0769† -6.471*
0.06777† 0.07314†
Other C
0.0532†
0.1752†
0.07110† 0.01339† 0.02562† 0.17909† 0.0996† 0.0552†
-7.6608* 0.09845†
†
†
†
†
†
†
Other O
0.0510
0.1656
0.06938 0.00794 0.02419 0.16843 0.0961
0.04863 0.0886†
-7.8047*
Notes: *Denotes own-price elasticity of product type j (j = 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 ,7 ,8 ,9 ,10) is different from own-price elasticity of product
type 1 at 95% significance level.
†
Denotes cross-price elasticity of product type pair (i, j) [i ≠ j, (i, j) ≠ (2,1)] is different from cross-price elasticity of product
type pair (2, 1) at 95% significance level.
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3.7. CONCLUSION
The organic food market has experienced tremendous growth. Along with the rapid
growth of organic products, new product features have also emerged and prospered.
Although how organic assortment, price, and promotions drive retailer performance has
been studied in previous works (Ngobo, 2011; Bezawada & Pauwels, 2013), the extant
literature does not, however, provide a clear understanding of how other product-related
(style, brand, nutrition, etc.) and seller-related factors influence consumers’ preferences
when choosing between organic products and conventional product. In response, we
study how consumers make complex purchase decisions involving organic products
among numerous other non-organic related attributes. By doing so, we also seek to find
the best assortment mix for retailers that carry both organic products and conventional
products.
Our main findings suggest that organic condition, product style, and seller attributes
are all highly influential in shaping consumers’ purchasing decisions. Further, the
relationship between organic and conventional products is much more nuanced and
context-specific than previously shown. We find organic products always have a higher
own-price elasticity than conventional products. Our results suggest that even organic
consumers are willing to pay a higher price, they are also sensitive to organic prices. This
phenomenon holds true even for the most health-conscious consumers----the Organic
Greek yogurt consumers. In fact, Organic Greek yogurt yields the highest own-price
elasticity, suggesting even the core organic consumers are price sensitive. Therefore,
retailers should carefully price their organic products, so that consumers would not be
driven away from the high organic pricing.
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From cross-price elasticity perspective, the asymmetry between organic products
and conventional products suggests that price change in conventional products has less
effect on organic products than vice-versa, consistent with the asymmetric price
competition literature (Sethuraman & Srinivasan, 2002). However, this effect is also
content-specific. Where in some product categories such as All-Natural yogurt and
Creamy yogurt, price change in conventional products has a greater effect on organic
products. This finding suggests that consumers have different preferences for different
product specifications. Manufacturers and retailers should carefully study consumers’
preferences in order to set the optimal price for their products.
In addition, we find that a low price strategy does not work well for organic products
either. As we could see from the example of Organic All-Natural yogurt, the low unit
price for this product category does not result in low own-price elasticity. Neither does
the low unit price increase more market share when other product categories increase
price.
Finally, we find that Conventional Creamy yogurt and All-Natural yogurt are close
substitutes for Organic Greek yogurt. Therefore, we find evidence that there is a group of
“health-conscious” consumers as well as a group of consumers that focuses on the taste
and texture of food. Retailers could utilize such information and optimize their
assortment mix to attract and retain their customers.
The following limitations from our study provide promising trajectories for further
analyses. First, our study involved only one product (yogurt) and product type (diary).
Future research may consider replicating our analysis across other product categories.
Second, due to the data limitation, we do not have accurate store locations, therefore we
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could not form the accurate choice set a consumer face when purchasing a product.
Future research may consider using more accurate geographic information to form a more
accurate choice set for consumers. Finally, we utilized data from the year 2008 to 2011,
where recent development in organic markets may have further changed consumers’
attitudes and habits towards buying organic products. Future research could utilize more
recent data to replicate our analysis.
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CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSION
In this dissertation, we investigate the impact of organic products on conventional
products and on retailer assortment planning. Specifically, we seek to answer the
following research questions.
•

Does conventional product variety increase or decrease when organic product is
introduced (or its variety increases) at the store level?

•

Does the control of assortment decisions in the supply chain affect assortments
between organic and conventional products?

•

How consumers evaluate organic products when there are multiple features and
attributes of the organic product, and directly evaluate the cannibalization effect
of conventional products on organic products.
Results from our study show that introducing organic products will result in an

increase in conventional product variety. This positive relationship between organic
product introduction and conventional product variety also holds when stores increase
their organic product offerings. We also find that when manufacturers are more
concentrated, and therefore more powerful in the supply chain and have control over
product assortment decisions, stores tend to have a less positive relationship between
organic product and conventional product variety. Similarly, when retailers are more
powerful with a strong private label presence, they tend to reduce branded conventional
products and increase private-label conventional products when introducing organic
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products. In addition, we find organic products always have a higher own-price elasticity
than conventional products, suggesting that even organic consumers are willing to pay a
higher price, they are also sensitive to organic prices. We also find that the cross-price
elasticities between organic products and conventional products are asymmetry. This
asymmetry cross-price elasticity suggests that price change in conventional products has
less effect on organic products than vice-versa.
Our studies make several theoretical contributions to research streams in assortment
planning and supply chain management. First, we show that introducing and increasing
organic product variety has a greater market expansion effect than its cost effect
associated with increasing product variety. That is, organic products, thanks to their
specialized group of customers, stimulate the demand for a variety of conventional
products within the same category. Therefore, instead of switching out the existing
conventional products with new organic products, retailers are better off further increase
the conventional product variety in the same product category. On the other hand, we also
confirm that the cost effect is significant when retailers face strict shelf space constraints.
Second, we show that the relationship between organic and conventional product
assortments are subject to the supply chain power and governance between the retailers
and manufacturers. In particular, we consider that supply chain power resides with a
concentrated group of manufacturers or retailers with strong private label presence. We
show that these two mechanisms lead to different results for conventional product
variety. With a smaller, concentrated manufacturer group, the retailer has less power and
control over product assortment decisions. And in this case, we show that a
manufacturer’s concerns of cost efficiency associated with organic products have a
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stronger effect on retailer assortment decisions, thereby mitigating the market expansion
effect for manufacturer brands. Moreover, we show that retailers with a strong private
label presence may leverage the pattern of expansion of organic product variety as an
opportunity to increase their private label conventional products and reduce their reliance
on national brand conventional product variety. Third, we find organic products always
have a higher own-price elasticity than conventional products. Our findings suggest that
even though organic consumers are willing to pay a higher price, they are also sensitive
to organic prices. Fourth, we find that the cross-price elasticity is asymmetry between
organic products and conventional products. However, this effect is also content-specific.
In some product categories such as All-Natural yogurt and Creamy yogurt, price change
in conventional products has a greater effect on organic products. This finding suggests
that consumers have different preferences for different product specifications.
Manufacturers and retailers should carefully study consumers’ preferences in order to set
the optimal price for their products.
Practitioners could also benefit from our findings of this study in a number of ways.
For retailers that have not yet launched organic products on their shelves, this study
points to the benefit of overall store sales from the introduction of organic products.
Retailers could use organic products to attract new variety-seeking consumers, who could
also buy conventional products as well. This way stores are also encouraged to add
variety for conventional products also. Increasing both organic product variety and
conventional variety will result in higher category level sales. Our study also suggests
retailers to carefully study their customers’ specific preferences on both organic and
conventional products. Further, they could leverage such information and select the best
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assortment mix within a product category to achieve better performance. From a
manufacturer’s perspective, by facing the growing pressure of supplying organic products
and meeting retailers’ demand for more variety in conventional products, manufacturers
should invest in clear product differentiation of their national brands (for organic and
conventional products) so that customers can be wooed away from the retail stores’
organic or private label brands. In addition, since producing both conventional products
and organic products may be costly, manufacturers could consider mergers and
acquisitions with small organic product producers, thereby increasing their overall
product portfolios.
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